VIEWS OF KABUL AND ENVIRONS

FROM PICTURES TAKEN BY THE PHOTOGRAPH SCHOOL OF THE CORPS OF BENGAL SAPPERS AND MINERS.

WITH

A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY AND BUILDINGS

AND

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

COMPILED BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. T. THACKERAY, V.C., ROYAL (LATE BENGAL) ENGINEERS

'Drink wine in the citadel of Kabul, and send round the cup without stopping; for there are mountains and streams, a town and a desert.'

ERSKINE'S *Translations of Baber.*

PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION.

1881.

PREFACE.

In offering this series of Views to the officers of the corps and regiments who served in the late Afghan Campaign, a few words of explanation may not be out of place.

The views have been printed by the Autotype Company from photographs taken by the Photograph School of the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners during the occupation of the city of Kabul by General Sir Donald Stewart and Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts, in the years 1879–80; and it is hoped that they may prove of interest to some of the officers who served in the late Afghan campaign, or their friends, and may perhaps tend to recall many arduous days and stirring scenes.

In the letterpress there is no original matter, and the brief historical sketch added at the end of the book is a compilation from the works of several authors.

The first part of the historical sketch, up to the reign of Ahmad Shah, is taken entirely from Elphinstone's *India*. That from the reign of Ahmad Shah, 1747, to the British invasion in 1838, from Colonel Malleson's *History of Afghanistan*.

In the latter part, I have endeavoured to give a faithful account of some of the more interesting operations around Kabul in the campaigns of 1879–81, based upon such data as I was able to obtain, but much has necessarily been omitted, especially in portions relating to the operations of the divisions commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Sir Samuel Browne and Sir O. Bright, and it has not always been possible to give full details where they would have been of great value.

The latter portion of the campaign of 1880, including the march of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and the defeat of Ayoob Khan, at Kandahar, in the battle of September

1st, have not been touched upon. The march from Kabul to Kandahar, and the battle at the latter place, have been fully described in a complete and detailed lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, on March 9th, 1881, by Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, C.B., R.A.

I have appended a list showing the sources of information drawn upon, and my grateful thanks are due to all those officers of whose works I have made use.

The latter part of the account of the operations of the several columns has been perceptibly hurried, as my furlough was drawing to a close.

In conclusion, I would state that any corrections, or further information, which may suggest themselves to the officers who were witnesses of the scenes, will be very gratefully received.

ADDLESTONE,
July 1881.

LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED.

ELPHINSTONE'S *History of India.*
MALLESON'S *History of Afghanistan.*
BURN'S *Kabul.*
BURN'S *Travels in Bokhara.*
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR VINCENT EYRE, *The Kabul Insurrection.*
LIEUTENANT GREENWOOD, 31st Regt., *The Afghanistan Campaign.*
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR MICHAEL BIDDULPH, 'The March from the Indus to the Helmund and back.' Vol. xxiv. No. cvii. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.*
MAJOR-GENERAL MAUNSELL, C.B., R.E., 'Report on the Operations of the Engineers of the First Division Peshawur Valley Field Force.' Vol. iv. No. 13, *Occasional Papers, Royal Engineer Institute.*
CAPTAIN ELIAS, 59th Regt., 'General Sir Donald Stewart's March from Kandahar to Ghazni.' Vol. xxiv. No. cvii. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.*
MAJOR COLQUHOUN, R.A., *With the Kurrum Field Force.*
LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON, 8th Regt., *Three Campaigns in Afghanistan.*

LIST OF VIEWS.

VIEWS OF KABUL AND ENVIRONS.

ANCIENT HISTORY AND SITE.

THE ancient history of the city of Kabul is unsatisfactory. The people themselves refer you to Noah's two sons, Kakul and Hakul, as the founders of their race, who, they say, quarrelled about the name of the place, and at length agreed to form it by taking a syllable from each name, hence Kabul.

The Hindoos assert that the ruler who was overthrown by the Mahomedans, and known by the name of Urj, was fourth in descent from Vikramjit; but no history brings Vikram so near our time as this. Urj is said by some to have been a Gubr, or fire-worshipper, and to have had two brothers, Silur and Ioor; he is also sometimes named Kabul Shah. The following passage was found in a work which treats of the conquest of Kabul by the Mahomedans, who state it to have been under their rule for 1240 years :—

'The army marched and encamped before Kabul. Kabul Shah, also well known by the name of Urj, came out to meet the Mahomedan force, commanded by Abdul Rahman, and having fought a very severe battle returned to the city and never again left it. Abdul Rahman fought with the besieged for a whole year, and encountered great hardships in taking the Hissar (citadel), but at last took it by the sword, slaying many soldiers, and capturing their wives and children. Kabul Shah, the king, was brought a prisoner before the

general, who ordered him to be put to death; but he read the Mahomedan creed (Kuluma) and became a Moslem, when Abdul Rahman honoured him highly.

'Abdul Rahman' then ordered all the booty of Kabul and Seistan to be brought forth: one-fifth of the plunder he sent home, with a letter announcing his victory.'

Oriental historians further describe Kabul as one of seven cities built by king Hushung, son of Syamuk, the other six being Tabristan, Isfahan, Old Merve, Babool, Kandahar, and Mudayar.

The extract goes to prove the Hissar, or Balar Hissar of Kabul, to be a far more ancient edifice than the time of the Chaghties, or their Mahomedan predecessors. Modern Kabul is given to the days of Sultan Mahmud; but the ancient city is said to have stood on the same hills as those on which the present one is built, only to the south of the citadel, and where the Armenian and other burying-grounds now are. In a country where earthquakes are so frequent, we need not be surprised at finding no remains of ancient architecture. In the locality pointed out as that of the ancient city many colossal idols are dug up; they are of mud, with a coating of red paint, and fall to pieces on the touch. These relics carry us back, without doubt, to the Hindoo age. The coins found in and about Kabul have Hindoo devices on them; yet, in the face of this evidence, many of the modern inhabitants of that caste will tell you that their emigration from India took place at no very remote date.

FROM BURN'S *Kabul*, p. 265.

KABUL.



THE CITY FROM UPPER BALA HISSAR.

KABUL.

THE CITY FROM ASMAI.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY.

THE city of Kabul has been so often described, that its principal features must be already familiar to the majority of English readers. The traveller who for the first time approaches it from the direction of Jalalabad, after having passed through the savage defiles, and toiled over the barren steeps that intervene, feels both relieved and delighted, on entering the plain of Kabul, by the picturesque aspect of the distant city, descried afar off in a gorge, between two lofty hills, up and along whose steep and rocky ridges is discernible a long line of massive wall, with numerous half-ruined towers, once forming an imposing barrier of defence against the sudden and devastating inroads of the western tribes.

The streets of the city are narrow, and the houses are built with flat roofs. To many of the better sort of private dwellings a garden is attached. The largest portion of the city stands on the right bank of the river, the opposite side being principally lined with walled gardens and private forts of the upper classes. The covered bazaar consisted of five open squares, connected by four arcades, down the centre of which a marble aqueduct conveyed a small running stream. The sides are lined with shops. The garden that contains the tomb of Baber was formerly the resort of busy merchants and lounging idlers, except on Fridays, when the shops of all true believers were shut and business suspended.

The great Bazaar, or Chunhut, is an arcade nearly 600 feet long and about 30 broad. It is divided into four equal parts. The plan is judicious, but it has been left unfinished, and the fountain and cistern that form a part of it lie neglected. There are no wheeled carriages in Kabul. The streets are intersected with small covered aqueducts of clear water, a great convenience to the people. Kabul is a compactly-built city, but the houses have no pretensions to elegance. They are constructed of sun-dried bricks and wood, and few of them are more than two stories high. It is thickly peopled, and has a population of about 60,000 souls. The Kabul river passes through the city. In rain there is not a dirtier place.

CLIMATE OF KABUL.

BY the 26th February the willow or bedee mislik had blossomed; on the 11th March, the first flower of spring, or the sosuri, a kind of small sweet-smelling iris, made its appearance, and on the 1st of April the apricots showed their blossoms. Nevertheless, it snowed on the 27th March; and tradition says that Ghazni was destroyed by snow nine and a half days after the vernal equinox. The superior coolness and salubrity of the climate of most parts of Afghanistan would appear to be due less to the differences of latitude than of elevation. The following are the heights of four places on the route from Peshawur to Kabul, and the climate may be said to improve in proportion to the increase of altitude.

Jalalabad	1964 feet.
Gundamuk	4616 „
Jugdulluk	5375 „
Kabul	6247 „

On the Kabul route the temperate climate begins at Gundamuk, beyond which snow usually covers the ground during the middle of winter. Snow begins to cover the hills around Kabul, but seldom visits the plains before December, when it accumulates fast upon the ground until the end of January, or middle of February, from which period to the end of April there is usually a fall of rain. The remainder of the year is dry.

KABUL.



THE CITY FROM ASMAI.

Earthquakes.

Convulsions of nature are exceedingly common in this part of the world. Baber mentions one to have occurred in his time on the plain of Reg Ruwan, so that in some places the ground was elevated to the height of an elephant above its old level, and in others as much depressed.

A severe earthquake took place in Kabul in 1831, and shocks happen as frequently as twice or thrice a month. A passing shake, with a rumbling noise, is called 'goozur,' to distinguish it from 'zeh zilla,' or earthquake, the term used by the inhabitants when a tremulous motion takes place.

THE CITY.

IF the City has no famous monuments or architectural beauty, it has at least some interesting particulars peculiar to it.

The two main bazaars, or thoroughfares, are simply two great diverging galleries, roofed in with rough logs of wood and reed matting.

In the shops, gaily coloured wares from every accessible land,—carpets of harmoniously blended hues from Persia, red cotton handkerchiefs from Manchester, are pressed indiscriminately into the service of the Oriental imagination. In summer, the pleasantest booths to linger in front of were the fruit-merchants', piled up with fresh fruit and every green stuff in season; or the confectioners', with their great blocks of white ice and their bowls of cunningly compounded sherbets.

In Plates I. and II., Timour's tomb forms a conspicuous object. It is of octagon shape, rising to a height of 50 feet. The interior is about 40 feet square.

KABUL.

VIEW OF THE CITY FROM SEAH SUNG.

SHERPUR.

VIEW OF SHERPUR FROM ASMAI.

SHERPUR.

PORTION OF SHERPUR SHEWING THE ALAIBAD KOTUL.

SHERPUR.

NORTH-EAST OF SHERPUR.

SHERPUR.



PORTION OF SHERPUR SHEWING THE SHER DURWAZA.

SHERPUR.



PORTION OF SHERPUR SHEWING THE R. E. PARK.

SHERPUR.

FROM Deh Afghan, right round to Bimaru, villages and walled gardens had been left standing at convenient distances from Sherpur.

The position of Sherpur was naturally so strong that a few days' digging made it safe against an enemy unprovided with guns.

One disadvantage only could not be overcome, the great size of the place, which held the whole force on guard, day and night for its protection. Telegraph wires were, however, placed all round the defences.

THE BALA HISSAR.

AMONG the public buildings in Kabul, the Bala Hissar, or Citadel, claims the first importance, but not from its strength. Kabul is enclosed to the south and west by high, rocky hills, and at the eastern extremity of these the Bala Hissar is situated, which commands the city. It stands on a neck of land, and may have an elevation of about 150 feet from the meadows of the surrounding country.

There is another fort under it, also called the Bala Hissar.

A palace in the Citadel, built by the brother of Dost Mahomed, was called the Koolah Feringee, or the European Hat.

Dost Mahomed Khan captured the Bala Hissar by blowing up one of its towers. It is a poor, irregular, and dilapidated fortification, and could never stand an escalade.

The upper fort is small, but that below will contain about 5000 people. The King's Palace stands in it.

The Bala Hissar was built by different princes of the house of Timour, from Baber downwards. Aurangzib prepared extensive vaults under it to defend his treasures. While it formed the Palace of Kabul, it was also the prison of the younger branches of the royal family, in which they were confined for life. They tell a story that when set free from prison, they looked with astonishment at seeing water flow, so close had been the confinement in their walled abode.

BURN'S *Travels in Bokhara.*



PART OF WALL, UPPER BALA HISSAR.



PART OF BALA HISSAR SHEWING THE OLD PALACE GARDENS.

THE BALA HISSAR GATE.

SHAH SOUJAH'S OLD PALACE, BALA HISSAR.

KABUL.



THE BALA HISSAR AND PALACE.



TOMB NEAR BALA HISSAR GATE.

TOMB NEAR THE BALA HISSAR GATE.

THE Tomb of the Emperor Baber is about a mile from the city. He had directed his body to be interred in this place,—to him the choicest in his wide dominion.

There is a noble prospect from the hill which overlooks Baber's Tomb. If my readers imagine a plain about twenty miles in circumference, laid out with gardens and fields in pleasing irregularity, intersected by three rivulets which wind through it by a serpentine course and wash innumerable little forts and villages, he will have before him one of the meadows of Kabul.

To the north lie the hills of Pughman, covered half-way down with snow, and separated from the eye by a sheet of rich verdure.

On the other side, the mountains, which are bleak and rocky, and the gardens of the city, so celebrated for fruit, lie beneath, the water being conducted to them with great ingenuity.

BURN'S *March in Bokhara.*

THE RESIDENCY.

IN Lieutenant Robertson's *Three Campaigns in Afghanistan*, the view from beneath the Castle Rock in Edinburgh is likened to the Bala Hissar, with Kabul stretching away below it. Call the Castle the upper Bala Hissar, the first house in the High Street the Residency, the Old Town the lower and inhabited part of the Bala Hissar, and the Princes Street Gardens beneath the Amir's palace, and you will represent very truly the scene where the hero Cavagnari, and his little band of followers, met their doom. There are the inevitable differences between north and south to be allowed for. Instead of the grey massive northern strength, you have crumbling, irregular outlines of turret and wall, hot and dusty like the sun-baked hills they crown.

The Afghan Sirdars, too, are better lodged than the old Scotch nobles. Their architects have to provide against heat as well as cold; so there are spacious courtyards, and whitewashed galleries and corridors, in place of peaked gables and squalid attics.

None the less the main positions on that terrible day in September may be filled in as indicated. In the centre of all was the lion at bay, with the toils closing round him. In the narrow lanes a mob of scowling, dark-faced men, mad, and baying for their prey like bloodhounds that have tasted human flesh. These, now arming themselves with stones and rifles, and at last with cannon, surged up to overwhelm the noble little band from the citadel above.

THE RESIDENCY—FRONT VIEW.

THE RESIDENCY—BACK VIEW.



INTERIOR OF THE RESIDENCY FROM UPPER BALA HISSAR.



VIEW FROM BIMARU SHEWING THE PUGHMAN RANGE.

BALA KITSAR FROM THE SHER DURWAZA.

BALA KITSAR FROM THE SHER DURWAZA.

KABUL.

LAHORE GATE, KABUL.

THE SHEWAKI MINAR.

KABUL.

GRAVES OF BRITISH OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.

VIEW FROM BIMARU SHOWING THE PUGHMAN RANGE.

BIMARU, or Husbandless, from a beautiful virgin who was buried there, is situated about half a mile to the north of the old cantonments on the Kohistan road, at the north-east extremity of a hill which bounds the plain to the west. It is built on a slope. There is a fine view of the Pughman range from this spot.

BRIDGE OVER THE KABUL RIVER.

THE Sufed Koh, or White Mountain Range, whose culminating, snow-clad peak attains an elevation of 15,622 feet, stretches from east to west, between the Khyber hills and Ghazni, like a stupendous, impassable barrier, whose minimum height is said to be 12,500 feet, and from whose long, massive range is thrown off an infinity of spurs on either flank to north and south.

It gives rise to several rivers, including the Arghandab (a feeder of the Helmund), flowing west towards Kandahar. The Kabul river, flowing north towards the capital, and thence turning eastward toward Peshawur. The Kurrum and Goorul rivers, flowing south and east through the famous valleys and passes so named, to mingle their respective waters with those of the great river Indus.

Major Rennell (one of the greatest of English geographers) places the scene of Alexander's operations and the seat of the Indian mountaineers to the south of the Kabul river, or Cophenes, and at a distance from the range of Caucasus, or Paropamisus. Strabo, however, expressly says that Alexander kept as near as he could to the northern mountains that he might cross the Choaspes (which falls into the Cophenes) and the other rivers as high up as possible. Arrian makes him cross the Cophenes, and then proceed through a mountainous country, and over three other rivers which fall into the Cophenes before he reaches the Indus. In his *Indica*, also, he mentions the Cophenes as bringing those three rivers with it and joining the Indus in Peucaliotis. It is only on the north bank of the Kabul river that three such rivers can be found; and even then there will be great difficulty in fixing their names, for in

BRIDGE OVER THE KABUL RIVER.

Arrian's own two lists he completely changes the names of two. Nor is this at all surprising, for most rivers in that part of the country have no name, but are called after some town or country on their banks, and not always after the same.

The Soastes would seem to be the river of Swat; but then there is no river left for the Guræus, which is between the Soastes and the Indus. Major Rennell, on a different theory, supposes the Guræus to be the Kabul river itself; but both of Arrian's accounts make the Guræus fall into the Cophenes, which afterwards falls into the Indus.

The Kabul river, therefore, must be the Cophenes, and the Indians are under the mountains between it, its upper branch (the Punjshir river), and the Indus.

FORT IN MAIDAN.

BUILDING with bricks and mortar is hardly known in Northern Afghanistan. The houses and walls are of sun-dried bricks laid in mud, or a sort of pisé and mud, which seems to last wonderfully when once dry. The mud is stirred up and trodden into a good consistency; it is then further manipulated, and is finally dabbed down on the wall: about 18 inches is thus built at a time and left to dry. All the defensible walls of forts and towns are thus made. The mud is sometimes mixed with straw.

This picture of a Fort in Maidan is a specimen of one of the forts so commonly met with in the valleys about Peshawur and Kohat, as well as near Kabul.



FORT IN MAIDAN.

CAMP OF GENERAL ROSS, SAIDABAD.

SAPPERS AND MINERS' CAMP AND OLD CANTONMENT, 1842, GUNDAMUK.

GUNDAMUK is situated on a stony plain that slopes gradually towards the mountains occupied by the Hazarehs. Near Gundamuk, on the right of the road leading to Kabul, is the hill on which the remains of the unfortunate 44th made their last stand on the retreat of the army from Kabul, in December, 1841. The Sepoys, who composed the principal force of General Elphinstone's army, had nearly all sunk under the hardships which they experienced, or were killed long before arriving at this place.

The wreck of the army, which consisted of about 170 men, principally Europeans, being unable to proceed further, determined to come to bay, and sell their lives as dearly as they could. They had expended their ammunition, and the enemy poured upon the exhausted and worn-out soldiers by thousands, and after a bloody conflict, the enormous numerical superiority of the Afghans gave them the victory. Every one of the gallant regiment of the army was killed, except Captain Souter and a drummer of the 44th. The gallant Captain Souter preserved his life by having saved the colours of his regiment. He had them wrapped round his body, and an Afghan chief, taking him from his extraordinary trappings to be a person of great distinction, ordered his life to be spared, thinking probably to get hereafter a good ransom for the prisoner. During the occupation of Gundamuk by British troops in May 1879, a large number of the bones of the brave, but unfortunate soldiers, who gallantly met their death on the hill, were collected and carefully buried, and a stone pillar was erected over the spot.

At Gundamuk the treaty of peace was signed by the Amir, Yakoob Khan, in May 1879. The Amir was received by the General, Sir Samuel Browne, and the whole of the troops, who were drawn up in line. In

November of the same year Yakoob Khan again passed through Gundamuk, being escorted as a close prisoner to India, after the massacre of the Envoy, Sir L. Cavagnari and his suite at Kabul. Gundamuk was held by the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, Kabul Field Force, from October until the 15th December, 1879, when General Charles Gough advanced to the relief of Sir Frederick Roberts at Kabul. The walls of the old cantonments of 1842 were still standing, and orders having been received to provide shelter for the troops, the old mud walls were utilised in constructing huts for the troops.

SAPPERS' AND MINERS' CAMP, 1842, GUNDAMUK.

VIEW OF GUNDAMUK LOOKING TOWARDS JUGDULLUK.

WE continued our march to Jugdulluk, and passed the Surkhab, or red river, by a bridge, with a variety of other small streams, which pour the melted snow of the Sufed Koh into that rivulet. The country is barren and miserable. Jugdulluk is a wretched place, with a few caves for a village.

There is a proverb which describes its misery: 'When the wood of Jugdulluk begins to burn you melt gold,' for there is no wood at hand in the bleak hills. We halted under a grove of trees, which is mentioned as the spot where Shah Zuman, one of the kings of Kabul, was blinded.

BURN'S *March in Bokhara.*

There are ruby mines in the neighbourhood of Jugdulluk. The rugged passes between Gundamuk and Jugdulluk have been the scenes of desperate fighting on many occasions. Lieutenant Greenwood, in his *Narration of the Afghanistan Campaign* in 1842, says, 'During this march we passed the barricade which the Afghan had built across the road to intercept the retreat of the late unfortunate army. The Afghans said that the Feringhees had fought most desperately here, and admitted that their own loss in defending the barricade against their attacks had been very serious. The bodies of the poor fellows and those of their horses were lying very thickly about,' &c., &c.

General Gough, when advancing from Gundamuk to the relief of Sherpur in December, 1879, was attacked by the enemy at Jugdulluk. The Afghans also attacked the convoys, and daily skirmishes and fighting took place in the passes between Jugdulluk and Pezwan. The post that commands the Pass at Jugdulluk Kotul was also attacked on three occasions, the enemy being beaten off by the small garrison that held the post.

Jugdulluk is now a village. It is about three and a half miles distant from the top of the Pass, or Jugdulluk Kotul, on the Kabul side.

VIEW AT GUNDAMUK LOOKING TOWARDS JUGDULLUK.

THE BALA HISSAR.

N the left, or eastern extremity of the city, occupying a low spur of hills and commanding the entire town, the Bala Hissar, or Citadel, with its lofty stone walls, bulky bastions, and enclosed crowd of high-storied buildings, forms a striking object.

The mountains of Pughman and Koh Daman, covered with snow during two-thirds of the year, form a magnificent back-ground to the scene.

UNDERGROUND WATER-COURSES, OR KAREZ.

THE peculiar and very successful system of subterranean canals so general in Afghanistan deserves special notice.

These water-courses have been long common throughout Persia and the adjoining countries. The extreme dryness of the climate which would induce loss by evaporation and absorption of all the water, and the rarity of running water, render this expedient most suitable. Several shafts are usually sunk at different depths where water is believed to exist, and when a supply is obtained at a suitable depth, the shafts are connected, and their united waters conveyed in one stream towards the surface at the required level. The spot is determined where the water shall issue on the surface; and thence at regular intervals of twenty or thirty paces, a series of shafts, about three and a half feet diameter, are sunk towards the source. When these have been dug to the intended level, they are connected by galleries of about the same sectional size as the shafts to convey the stream, both shaft and artificial galleries seldom having any artificial support. They run sometimes as far as twenty miles before reaching the surface. The practice of making them seems confined to certain families.

Whole villages depend on these streams for water, both for drinking and irrigation; mills are also worked by them. They are said to have been first constructed by King Hushung, anterior to the time of Zoroaster.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF KABUL,

FROM THE ARAB INVASION (A.D. 664).

I.

THE first recorded invasion of this unsubdued tract was in the year of the Hijra 44, when an Arab force from Merv penetrated to Kabul, and made converts of 12,000 persons.

The prince of Kabul, also, must have been made tributary, if not subject, for his revolt is mentioned as the occasion of a fresh invasion of his territories in 62 of the Hijra.

On this occasion the Arabs met with an unexpected check: they were drawn into a defile, defeated, and compelled to surrender, and to purchase their freedom by an ample ransom. One old contemporary of the Prophet is said to have disdained all compromise, and to have fallen by the swords of the infidels.

The disgrace was immediately revenged by the Arab governor of Sistan; it was more completely effaced in the year 80 of the Hijra, when Abdurehman, governor of Khorasan, led a large army in person against Kabul, and, avoiding all the snares laid for him by the enemy, persevered until he had reduced the greater part of the country to submission. His proceedings on this occasion displeased his immediate superior, Hujaj, governor of Basra, so well known in Arabian history for his violence and cruelty; and the dread of his ulterior proceedings drove Abdurehman into rebellion. He took Basra, occupied Cufa, recently the capital, and threatened Damascus, which was then the residence of the Calif. In this struggle,

which lasted for six years (from A.D. 699 to A.D. 705), he was supported by the prince of Kabul; and the inability of his ally to give him a secure refuge when defeated at length drove him to a voluntary death.

During all this time Ferishta represents the Afghans to have been Mussulmans, and seems to have been been led, by their own traditions, to believe that they had been converted in the time of the Prophet himself. He represents them as invading the territory of the Hindus as early as the year 63 of the Hijra, and as being ever after engaged in hostilities with the raja of Lahore, until, in conjunction with the Gakkars (a people on the hills east of the Indus), they brought him to make them a cession of territory, and in return secretly engaged to protect him from the attacks of the other Mussulmans. It was owing to this compact, says Ferishta, that the princes of the house of Samani never invaded the north of India, but confined their predatory excursions to Sind.

He also mentions that the Afghans gave an asylum to the remains of the Arabs who were driven out of Sind in the second century of the Hijra.

Setting aside the fable of their connexion with the Prophet, this account does not appear improbable. The Afghans, or a part of them, may have been early converted, although not conquered until the time of Sultan Mahmud.

In the accessible parts of their country, especially on the west, they may have been early reduced to submission by the Arabs; but there are parts of the mountains where they can hardly be said to be entirely subdued even to this day.

We know nothing of their early religion, except the presumption, arising from the neighbourhood of Balkh and their connexion with Persia, that they were worshippers of fire. Mahometan historians afford no light, owing to their confounding all denominations of infidels.

The first appearance of the Mahometans in India was in the year of the Hijra 44, at the time of their first expedition to Kabul.

Of the period between the years 664 A.D. and 961 A.D., little is recorded of the history of Kabul.

It was in the reign of Abdulmelek, the fifth prince of the house of Samani, that Alptegin, the founder of this new dynasty, rose into importance. He was a Turki slave, and his original duty is said to have been to amuse his master by tumbling and tricks of legerdemain.*

It was the fashion of the time to confer offices of trust on slaves; and Alptegin, being a man of good sense and courage, as well as integrity, rose in time to be governor of Khorasan. On the death of his patron, he was consulted about the best person of the family for a successor; and happening unluckily, to give his suffrage against Mansur, on whom the choice of the other chiefs had fallen, he incurred the ill-will of his sovereign, was deprived of his government, and if he had not displayed great military skill in extricating himself from among his enemies, he would have lost his liberty, if not his life. He had, however, a body of trusty adherents, under whose protection he made good his retreat, until he found himself in safety at Ghazni, in the heart of the mountains of Soliman. The plain country, including Balkh, Herat, and Sistan, received the new governor, and remained in obedience to the Samanis; but the strong tract between that and the Indus bade defiance to all their attacks; and though not all subject to Alptegin, all contributed to secure his independence. One historian states that he was accompanied on his retreat by a body of 3000 disciplined slaves or Mamluks, who would, of course, be Turks of his own original condition.†

The inhabitants of the cultivated country were not unwarlike; and the Afghans of the hills, even when their tribe did not acknowledge his authority, would be allured by his wages to enter his ranks. He seems to have made no attempt to extend his territory; and he died within fourteen years after he became independent.‡

He was succeeded by Sebektegin, a slave whom he had brought with him from Turkestan, and whom,

* D'Herbelot, article 'Alpteghin.'

† Price, from the *Kholásat al Akhbár*, vol. ii. p. 243.

‡ Price, vol. ii. p. 277. Briggs, *Ferishta*, vol. i. p. 13.

by degrees, he had raised to so much power and trust, that at his death he was the effective head of his government, and in the end became his successor.

Sebektegin had scarcely time to take possession of his new kingdom before he was called on to exert himself in its defence.

The establishment of a Mahometan government so near to their frontier as that of Ghazni must naturally have disquieted the Hindus on the Indus, and appears to have led to their being harassed by frequent incursions. At length Jeipal, raja of Lahore, whose dominions were contiguous to those of Ghazni, determined to become assailant in his turn. He led a large army into Laghman, at the mouth of the valley, which extends from Peshawur to Kabul and was there met by Sebektegin. While the armies were watching a favourable opportunity for engaging, they were assailed by a furious tempest of wind, rain and thunder, which were ascribed to supernatural causes, and so disheartened the Indians, naturally more sensible to cold and wet than their antagonists, that Jeipal was induced to make proposals of an accommodation. Sebektegin at length consented to treat; and Jeipal surrendered fifty elephants and engaged to pay a large sum of money. When he found himself again in safety, he refused to fulfil this part of his agreement, and even threw the messenger sent to demand the execution of it into prison.

Sebektegin again assembled his troops, and recommenced his march towards the Indus, while Jeipal called in the assistance of the rajas of Delhi, Ajmir, Calinjar, and Kanouj, and advanced to Laghman with an army of 100,000 horse, and a prodigious number of foot-soldiers. Sebektegin ascended a height to view the enemy, and beheld the whole plain covered with their innumerable host; but he was nowise dismayed at the prospect; and relying on the courage and discipline of his own troops, he commenced the attack with an assurance of victory. He first pressed one point of the Indian army with a constant succession of charges by fresh bodies of cavalry; and when he found them begin to waver, he ordered a general assault along the whole line: the Indians at once gave way, and were pursued, with a dreadful slaughter, to the Indus. Sebektegin found a rich plunder in

their camp, and levied heavy contributions on the surrounding districts. He also took possession of the country up to the Indus, and left an officer with 10,000 horse, as his governor of Peshawur. The Afghans and Khiljis, or Ghilzais, of Lughman immediately tendered their allegiance, and furnished useful recruits to his army.

After these expeditions, he employed himself in settling his own dominion, which now extended on the west to beyond Kandahar. Sebektegin died on his way back to Ghazni, A.D. 997, and was succeeded in the House of Ghazni by Sultan Mahmud, who was born from a Persian mother, and was in language and manners a Persian. Mahmud was perhaps the richest king that ever lived. On hearing of the wealth of some former dynasty, who had accumulated jewels enough to fill seven measures, he exclaimed, 'Praise be to God, who has given me a hundred measures!'

Early in the spring of A.D. 1398, Pir Mohammed, the grandson of Tamerlane, who had been employed in reducing the Afghans in the mountains of Suliman, crossed the Indus, and soon after laid siege to Multan — an operation which occupied him for upwards of six months.

Meanwhile Tamerlane passed Hindoo Kush by the usual route to Kabul, left that city in August, and marched by Haryub and Bannu to Dinkot on the Indus. His subsequent victories, and the burning and sack of the city of Delhi, are fully described in the second volume of Elphinstone's *India.*

In the year A.D. 1524, Doulat Khan Lodi, the governor of the Panjab, revolted against the government of Ibrahim Lodi, and called in the aid of Baber, who had for some time reigned in Kabul. Baber had before invaded the Panjab, which he claimed as part of the inheritance of Tamerlane, and he now gladly availed himself of this invitation; but some other Afghan chiefs, either from attachment to Ibrahim or aversion to a foreigner, drove out Doulat Khan, and opposed Baber in the field. They were totally defeated near Lahore, and that city was reduced to ashes by the victors.

Fearing treachery at home, Baber determined to return to Kabul. He, nevertheless, kept his hold on the country, and reduced and left persons on whom he could depend in the principal places. The early

life of Baber was a tissue of surprising vicissitudes and romantic adventures. He was the sixth in descent from Tamerlane.

Of Baber it is related that, after all that he had done and suffered (enough to fill up an eventful life), Baber was yet only in his twenty-third year. He bore his numerous reverses with the elasticity of youth. He himself tells us that he often shed many tears and composed many melancholy verses; but in general his cheerful temper buoyed him up, and enabled him to enjoy the present, and to entertain favourable prospects for the future. He says he never had more perfect pleasure than for a few days after he evacuated Samarcand, when he first got a full meal, a quiet night's rest, and a temporary freedom from labour and anxiety. He had often similar moments of enjoyment, thanks to his sociable habits and his relish for simple pleasures. He pauses, in relating one of his desperate expeditions, to describe a particular sort of melon with which he had been struck. If ever he had an interval of rest he was occupied with plants and gardening; and during all his marches, in peace or war, flowers and trees, and cheerful landscapes, were never thrown away on him. It may be because others have not opened their hearts as he has done, but there certainly is no person in Asiatic history into whose tastes and feelings we can enter as into Baber's.

Baber occupied Kabul almost without opposition (A.D. 1504), and, regarding the original owner as completely ejected, he took possession in his own name, and subsequently resisted an attempt of his cousin to regain his inheritance. He afterwards lost Bactria, which was recovered by Khusru Shah, and ultimately conquered by the Uzbeks. Baber's connexion with the country beyond the mountains was therefore entirely cut off. He was now king of Kabul, over which country he reigned for twenty-two years before his conquest of India, and which was enjoyed by his descendants until the end of the seventeenth century.

His first years were spent in the conquest of Kandahar, in expeditions into the mountains of the Afghans and Hazarehs, and in a dangerous journey to Herat to concert measures with that branch of the house of

Tamerlane for their common defence against the Uzbeks. On these occasions he underwent the usual risks, and more than the usual hardships of war, and had once nearly perished in the snow during a winter march through the mountains of the Hazarehs.

In this period his brother Jehangir revolted (A.D. 1506); but was subdued and pardoned: a more serious insurrection took place while he was at Herat, when his Mogul troops set up one of his cousins as king, who was also defeated and pardoned (A.D. 1507); and he was afterwards brought to the brink of ruin by a conspiracy of the Moguls, who had come over from Khusru Shah. These men, from two to three thousand in number, gave the first sign of their disaffection by an attempt to seize Baber's person; and when he had escaped and fled from Kabul, they called in Abdu Rizak, the son of Ulugh Beg, whom Baber had supplanted in the government (A.D. 1508).

In A.D. 1514 he suffered a total defeat by the Uzbeks in Transoxiana, and lost all his possessions except Bactria. It was after this failure that he turned his serious attention to India, and began a series of enterprises which resulted in the conquest of India.

After the capture of Agra, Baber's first act was to distribute the captured treasures to his adherents. He gave his son Humayun a diamond, which was esteemed one of the finest in the world; and he sent a present of a shahrukhi each to every man, woman and child, slave or free, in the country of Kabul.

Before his great victory at Fattehpur Sikri, about twenty miles from Agra, Baber had promised that he would allow any one who pleased leave of absence to Kabul. He formed all who desired to avail themselves of that permission into a detachment, and sent them back under the command of Humayun.

During the siege of Chanderi, Baber received intelligence of the defeat of his detachment in Oudh by an Afghan chief named Baba, or Biban, and immediately marched himself in that direction. The Afghans having taken post at the passage of the Ganges, Baber threw a bridge over the river, under the fire of his artillery, and ultimately compelled the enemy to retire beyond the Gogra, whither he marched in pursuit of them. He seems to have compelled the rebels to take refuge in the territories of the king of Bengal, and it was probably on

this occasion that he reduced Behar; if that was not done before by Humayun: but in this place there is an interruption in the Memoirs, which is not filled up.

For some months after this, Baber seems to have been in bad health, and to have indulged in a longer course of relaxation than often fell to his lot. His memoirs (which are now resumed) are filled with descriptions of Hindu forts and temples, and of fountains and cascades that he had visited; as well as of his own gardens and improvements, and of the jugglers, wrestlers, and other sources of amusement peculiar to India.

For the last fifteen months of his life Baber's health seems to have been greatly broken: the silence of his diary gives a proof of his diminished activity, and some circumstances lead to a belief that his authority began to be weakened by the prospect of its speedy cessation. Humayun left his government of Badakhshan without leave, and Khalifa, Baber's prime minister, on being selected to replace him, found means to excuse himself, and remain at court. Notwithstanding Humayun's unlooked-for return, he was affectionately received; and a dangerous illness, with which he was soon after attacked, was the immediate cause of the death of Baber.

Baber was the most admirable, though not the most powerful, prince that ever reigned in Asia. He died, at Agra (A.D. 1530), in the fiftieth year of his age and the thirty-eighth of his reign. His body was buried, by his own desire, at Kabul, and on a spot which it is probable that he had himself selected.

Baber's character is best shown in his actions; but something remains to be said of his private life and his writings. His memoirs are almost singular in their own nature, and perfectly so if we consider the circumstances of the writer. They contain a minute account of the life of a great Tartar monarch, along with a natural effusion of his opinions and feelings, free from disguise and reserve, and no less free from all affectation of extreme frankness and candour.

His style is plain and manly, as well as lively and picturesque, and being the work of a man of genius and observation, it presents his countrymen and contemporaries, in their appearance, manners, pursuits, and actions, as clearly as in a mirror. In this respect it is almost the only specimen of real history in Asia; for the

ordinary writers, though they give pompous accounts of the deeds and ceremonies of the great, are apt to omit the lives and manners even of that class; while every thing beneath their level is left entirely out of sight. In Baber, the figures, dress, tastes, and habits of each individual introduced, are described with such minuteness and reality that we seem to live among them, and to know their persons as well as we do their characters. His description of the countries he visited, their scenery, climate, productions, and works of art and industry, is more full and accurate than will, perhaps, be found, in equal space, in any modern traveller; and, considering the circumstances in which the Memoirs were compiled, they are truly surprising.

But the great charm of the work is in the character of the author, whom we find, after all the trials of a long life, retaining the same kind and affectionate heart, and the same easy and sociable temper, with which he set out on his career, and in whom the possession of power and grandeur had neither blunted the delicacy of his taste, nor diminished his sensibility to the enjoyment of nature and imagination.

He speaks with as much interest of his mother and female relations as if he had never quitted their fireside; and his friends make almost as great a figure in the personal part of his narrative as he does himself. He repeats their sayings, records their accidents and illnesses, relates their adventures, and sometimes jokes on their eccentricities.

After a letter, on the affairs of his government, to his most confidential counsellor, Khaja Kilan (then at Kabul), he tells him little anecdotes of their common acquaintances, which he thinks will amuse him, and adds, 'For God's sake excuse all these fooleries, and do not think the worse of me for them.' He endeavours afterwards to persuade Khaja Kilan to leave off wine, as he had done; and says, in substance, 'Drinking was a very pleasant thing with our old friends and companions; but now that you have only Shir Ahmed and Heider Kuli to take your wine with, it can be no great sacrifice to leave it off.' In the same letter he says how much he envies his friend his residence at Kabul, and adds, 'They very recently brought me a single musk melon: while cutting it up, I felt myself affected with a strong feeling

of loneliness, and a sense of my exile from my native country, and I could not help shedding tears while eating it.'

It would have been fortunate if Baber had left off wine sooner, for there seems good reason to think his indulgence in it tended to shorten his days. Many a drinking party is recorded in his memoirs, with at least as much interest as his battles or negotiations; and unsuitable as they are to his station, they are not the least agreeable scenes in Baber's history. The perfect ease and familiarity among the company makes one forget the prince in the man; and the temptations that generally lead to those excesses,—a shady wood, a hill with a fine prospect, or the idleness of a boat floating down a river; together with the amusements with which they are accompanied, extemporary verses, recitations in Turki and Persian, with sometimes a song, and often a contest of repartee, take away all the coarseness that might attach to such scenes of dissipation.

The unsettled nature of his life is shown by his observing, near the end of it, that since he was eleven years old he had never kept the fast of the Ramzan twice in any one place; and the time not spent in war and travelling was occupied in hunting and other sports, or in long excursions on horseback about the country. On his last journey, after his health had begun to fail, he rode in two days from Calpi to Agra (160 miles) without any particular motive for despatch; and on the same journey he swam twice across the Ganges, as he said he had done with every other river he had met with. His mind was as active as his body: besides the business of the kingdom, he was constantly taken up with aqueducts, reservoirs, and other improvements, as well as introducing new fruits and other productions of remote countries. Yet he found time to compose many elegant Persian poems, and a collection of Turki compositions, which are mentioned as giving him a high rank among the poets of his own country.*

Baber left three sons besides Humayun; Camran, Hindal, and Mirza Askari.

Camran was governor of Kabul and Kandahar, and the other two were unemployed in India. From

* Almost all that has been said of Baber has been drawn from Mr. Erskine's admirable translation of his Memoirs from the Turki.

his having assigned no shares to his younger children it is probable that Baber did not intend to divide the empire: but Camran showed no disposition to give way to his brother; and as he was in possession of a strong and warlike country, he had a great advantage over Humayun, who could not assemble an army without evacuating his new and disaffected provinces.

Humayun thought it prudent to give up the Panjab and the country on the Indus, in addition to Camran's former territories.

Humayun was totally defeated by Shir Shah on the banks of the Ganges, near Buxar, and was himself nearly drowned in the river.

After this disaster, prince Camran, on being applied to by the king's representatives, immediately set out for Kabul, professedly to support Humayun's interests, but in reality to be at hand to profit by any opportunity of advancing his own.

The arrival of Humayun put a stop to all those designs. He pardoned his brother Hindal, who had also rebelled, and the three brothers united their exertions to arrest the progress of their common enemy.

Humayun was again defeated by Shir Shah on the Ganges, opposite Kanouj, and it was with great difficulty that he escaped to join Camran at Lahore. Even there Humayun was no welcome guest. Camran was equally afraid of being supplanted by him at home, and of being involved in his quarrel with Shir Shah, and lost no time in making his peace with the conqueror, to whom he ceded the Panjab and retired himself to Kabul, leaving Humayun to provide as he could for his own safety. Humayun captured Kandahar from the Persians in September, 1545.

After the occupation of Kandahar, Humayun marched for Kabul (which was again in possession of Camran, who had revolted), although the winter had set in with extraordinary severity. As he advanced, he was joined by his brother Hindal; and afterwards by other deserters in such numbers that when he reached Kabul, Camran found it impossible to resist, and fled to Bakkar on the Indus. Humayun entered Kabul and recovered his son Akber, now between two and three years of age.

After remaining for some months at Kabul, Humayun set out to recover Badakhshan, which was in the hands of Mirza Soliman. Before his departure he thought it prudent to put his cousin Yadgar Mirza, who had just joined him and was suspected of fresh intrigues, to death. What is remarkable in this event is, that the governor of Kabul flatly refused to carry the order into execution, and that Humayun directed another person to perform it without inflicting any punishment on the governor.

While Humayun was at Badakhshan, where he remained for many months, Camran returned from Sind and surprised Kabul. Humayun marched against him in the dead of winter, defeated his troops and drove him within the walls. On this and all subsequent occasions during the siege, Humayun put his prisoners to death in cold blood, which Camran retaliated by still greater cruelties, and even threatened to expose young Akber, who had again fallen into his hands, to the fire of the cannon, if they continued to batter the town.

At length Camran was compelled to quit Kabul (April, 1547). He made his escape in the night, and fled to Gori, in the south of Bactria. Being after some time dislodged from thence by a detachment of Humayun's, he had recourse to the Uzbeks, and by their aid he recovered Badakhshan. During these operations the summer passed, and Humayun was constrained by the snow to defer his march from Kabul until the next spring. He then set out for Badakhshan, where Camran was defeated, driven into Talekan, and being disappointed of the assistance he expected from the Uzbeks, reduced to surrender (August 1548). On this occasion Humayun behaved with perfect good faith and humanity: he treated Camran with great kindness; and three of the brothers being now together, he released the fourth, and they all assembled at a feast where they *ate salt* together and were for the time entirely reconciled.

After this Humayun returned to Kabul. Next spring (1549) he set out to attack the Uzbeks in Balkh; and he appears at last to have acquired a sufficient spirit of enterprise; for having taken the small fort of Eibak he immediately began to hold consultations about the conquest of Transoxiana; but at the moment of his reaching Balkh, where he had beat off a sally of the garrison, he received intelligence that Camran

had rebelled, and was threatening Kabul; and on commencing his march on his return to his capital, he was so pressed by the Uzbeks that his retreat soon became a flight, and it was with difficulty that his troops made their way in total confusion and disorder to a place of safety. This calamity shook the fidelity of his remaining adherents; and in a battle which took place soon after, some of his greatest chiefs deserted him; he was wounded, and nearly lost his life in the defeat which followed (1550). Humayun now fled with only eleven attendants, among whom was Jouher, the author of the Memoirs. He underwent many hardships, and for some time suffered from his wound: in the end he reached Badakhshan, where Mirza Soliman for the first time supported him. On his flight Camran again took Kabul, and Akber once more fell into his hands. But in a subsequent battle, fortune proved favourable to Humayun; Camran was obliged to take refuge in the Khyber mountains; Kabul was taken, and all the country restored to obedience (1551).

The king soon after marched against the Khalils, the tribe which had harboured Camran. He was attacked in the night by those mountaineers; his brother Hindal was killed, and he was obliged to take refuge in Besut, a small fort in the pass between Peshawur and Kabul. The Afghans did not follow up their advantage, and while Camran was feasted in turn by successive tribes, Humayun again took the field, defeated the Afghans, and compelled Camran to fly to India, where he sought an asylum with Sultan Selim, the successor of Shir Shah (1552). Receiving no encouragement in that quarter, he fled to the Sultan of the Gakkars, and was ultimately betrayed by him to Humayun, three years after his last expulsion from Kabul (1553).

Though Camran's repeated offences would have justified his immediate execution, they do not in the least reconcile us to the treatment he received when given up.

Humayun had come into the Gakkar territory to receive the prisoner; and Camran, when brought before him, advanced with great humility; but Humayun received him graciously, seated him on his right hand, and soon after some water-melon being handed round, he gave half of the piece he had taken to his brother. In the evening there was an entertainment with singers, and the night was passed in jollity and carousing.

Next day passed in the same manner: during the course of it some of his counsellors asked Humayun what he intended to do with his brother; and he answered, 'Let us first satisfy the Gakkar chief, and then I will do what is thought proper.'

On the third day the Gakkar chief was satisfied, and it was determined that Camran should be blinded. At first no person was willing to undertake the duty, and the king had given the order just as he was setting off on his march. One officer rode after him, and told him in Turki the difficulty that had arisen; on which the king reviled him, and asked why he had not done it himself? On the officer's return, the order was made known to Camran, with many expressions of sorrow, and the operation was performed by piercing his eyes repeatedly with a lancet.

Camran, now no longer dangerous, was permitted to go to Mecca, where he soon after died.

After this transaction, Humayun was desirous of proceeding to Kashmir, but hearing of the advance of Selim Shah, he retreated to Kabul, and spent the next year at that place and Kandahar.

In January 1555 Humayun set out from Kabul with 15,000 horse: he invaded the Panjab, defeated the governor of Sekander, and took possession of Lahore, where he remained for some time to settle the provinces.

At Sirhind he defeated Sekander, who had advanced to meet him with a large army. Humayun gained a decided victory, and immediately took possession of Agra and Delhi. Humayun, though thus restored to his capital, had recovered but a small portion of his original dominions, and even that he did not long live to enjoy. In less than six months after his return to Delhi he met with an accident which occasioned his almost immediate death.

Akber was only thirteen years and four months old at his father's death, and though unusually manly and intelligent for his age, was obviously incapable of administering the government. He had been sent by Humayun as the nominal head of the army in the Panjab, but the real command was vested in Behram Khan; and the same relation was preserved after Akber's accession. Behram received a title equivalent

to that of 'the king's father,' and was invested with the unlimited exercise of all the powers of sovereignty.

At the time of Humayun's death, Behram was engaged in putting an end to the resistance of Sekander, who had retired to the skirts of the northern mountains, and still retained his pretensions to be king of Delhi and the Panjab. He had scarcely time to arrange the new government, when he received intelligence that Mirza Soliman of Badakhshan had taken possession of Kabul and all that part of Humayun's late dominions; and while he was considering the means of repairing this disaster, he learned that Hemu had set out with an army on the part of Sultan Adili, for the double purpose of expelling the Moguls and reducing the rebellion of Sekander. In this contest the Afghans were defeated. Hemu was mortally wounded and taken prisoner and brought to Akber's tent. Behram was desirous that Akber should give him the first wound, and thus, by imbruing his sword in the blood of so distinguished an infidel, should establish his right to the envied title of 'Ghazi,' or 'Champion of the Faith;' but the spirited boy refused to strike a wounded enemy, and Behram, irritated by his scruples, himself cut off the captive's head at a blow.

Before the Uzbek rebellion, in the year A.D. 1561 (A.H. 969), two of Akber's chiefs, Abul Maali and Sherf u din, had revolted at Nagor, had defeated the king's troops, and advanced towards Delhi. They were afterwards driven back in their turn, and forced to seek for safety beyond the Indus. They retired with the remains of their force to Kabul, where circumstances secured them a favourable reception.

This kingdom was left at the death of Humayun under the nominal government of his infant son, Mirza Hakin, and immediately after was overrun, as has been mentioned, by his relation, Soliman of Badakhshan; and, though soon afterwards recovered, was never really in obedience to Akber. The government was in the hands of the prince's mother, who maintained her difficult position with ability, though not more exposed to danger from foreign enemies than from the plots and usurpations of her own ministers.

She had recently been delivered from a crisis of the latter description, when she was joined by the rebellious chiefs from India; and before long she was induced to confide the control of her affairs to Abul Maali. That

adventurer at first showed himself a useful minister; but his secret views were directed to objects very different from the establishment of the Begum's authority, and as soon as he had himself formed a party in the kingdom, he had her assassinated, and took the government into his own hands. The aid of Mirza Soliman was now invoked, and the result was the defeat and death of Abul Maali (1563). Mirza Soliman affected to leave his young relation in possession of Kabul, but really placed him under the tutelage of one of his dependents, whose yoke was so irksome that Mirza Hakim rose against it; and, after a struggle with Soliman, was overcome and chased out of Kabul. This took place in the last year of the war with the Uzbek chiefs; and Hakim, although he had received such assistance as the times admitted from Akber, yet, conceiving his brother's hands to be fully occupied with the rebellion, at once resolved to indemnify himself at his expense, seized on Lahore, and took possession of the greater part of the Panjab. This invasion ended in the expulsion of Prince Hakim from India (November, 1566); and an opportune change of circumstances at the same moment opened the way for his return to Kabul, of which country he remained for a considerable period in undisturbed possession.

In the year A.D. 1581, Mirza Hakim, with views of further aggrandisement, again invaded the Panjab. Raja Man Sing, the governor, was compelled to retire before him, and to take refuge in Lahore; and Akber found it necessary to proceed himself with an army to raise the siege and deliver the province. Mirza Hakim retreated before him; and the emperor, whose situation no longer required his allowing such attacks to pass with impunity, followed up his success, crossed the Indus, and, after a feeble opposition on the part of his brother, took possession of Kabul. Mirza Hakim fled to the mountains. He afterwards made his submission, and Akber generously restored him to his government. He thenceforth, probably, remained in real subordination to his brother.

When prince Hakim died and Kabul came directly under Akber, the government was given to Rajah Man Sing, whose talents and connexion with the emperor were supported by the forces which he could draw from his hereditary dominions.

In the year A.D. 1586, Raja Man Sing marched against the Eusofzais; and after being exposed to considerable hazard, he succeeded in gaining a partial success. The Roushenias, however, stood their ground, and the ascendancy of the government was not restored till the next year, when a combined attack was made by Man Sing from Kabul, and a force detached by Akber to cross the Indus to the south of the salt range.

The religious war was continued during the next two reigns (of Jehangir and Shah Jehan); when at last the enthusiasm of the Roushenias wore out, the free spirit of the Afghans, which had owed nothing to its success, survived its extinction: the north-east tribes were never more formidable than in the reign of Aurangzib; and the Eusofzais have resisted repeated attacks from the Mogul emperors, and afterwards from the kings of Persia and Kabul, and retain their turbulent independence undiminished to the present day.

The emperor Akber died A.D. 1605, and was succeeded by his son Selim, who assumed the title of Jehangir (Conqueror of the World).

In the spring of 1606, Jehangir went to Kabul; and when at that city he showed some favour to his eldest son Khusru, who was at that time a prisoner for rebellion. He ordered Khusru's chains to be taken off, allowing him to walk in a garden within the upper citadel. If he had any disposition to carry his forgiveness further, it was checked by a conspiracy, which was detected some time after, to release Khusru and to assassinate the emperor.

In the year 1611, a rebellion of the Roushenias, a religious sect, broke out, in which the city of Kabul was exposed to danger, but was terminated by the death of Ahdad, the grandson and spiritual successor of Bayazid.

In 1622, Mohabat Khan, the most rising general of the time, was summoned to court by the empress Nur Jehan, from his government of Kabul, and was treated with every mark of favour and confidence.

Mohabat Khan was the son of Ghor Beg, a native of Kabul. He had attained the rank of a com-

mander of 500 under Akber and was raised to the highest dignities and employments by Jehangir. He had long enjoyed a high place in the opinion of the people and was considered the most eminent of all the emperor's subjects. This circumstance alone might have been sufficient to excite the jealousy of Nur Jehan, the consort of the emperor Jehangir.

Whatever might be the motive, in the year 1625 Mohabat was again summoned to court to answer charges of oppression and embezzlement. He at first made excuses for not attending, but finding that his appearance was insisted on, he set out on his journey, accompanied by a body of 5000 Rajputs whom he had contrived to attach to his service.

When Mohabat himself approached the camp, he was informed that he would not be admitted to the emperor's presence; and, perceiving that his ruin was predetermined, he resolved not to wait till he should be separated from his troops, but to strike a blow, the very audacity of which should go far to insure its success.

Jehangir was at this time encamped on the Hydaspes, and was preparing to cross it, by a bridge of boats, on his way to Kabul. He sent the army across the river, in the first instance, intending to follow at his leisure, when the crowd and confusion should be over. The whole of the troops had passed, and the emperor remained with his personal guards and attendants, when Mohabat, getting his men under arms a little before day-break, sent a detachment of 2000 men to seize the bridge, and moved himself, with all speed, to the spot where the emperor was encamped. The place was quickly surrounded by his troops; while he himself, at the head of a chosen body of 200 men, pushed straight for the emperor's tent. The attendants were overthrown and dispersed before they were aware of the nature of the attack; and Jehangir, who was not quite recovered from the effects of his last night's debauch, was awakened by the rush of armed men around his bed: he started up, seized his sword, and, staring wildly round, he perceived what had befallen him, and exclaimed, 'Ah! Mohabat Khan! traitor! what is this?' Mohabat Khan replied by prostrating himself on the ground, and lamenting that the persecution of his enemies had forced him to have

recourse to violence to obtain access to his master. Jehangir at first could scarcely retain his indignation; but, observing, amidst all Mohabat's humility, that he was not disposed to be trifled with, he gradually accommodated himself to his circumstances, and endeavoured to conciliate his captor. Mohabat now suggested to him that, as it was near his usual time of mounting, it was desirable that he should show himself in public to remove alarm and check the misrepresentations of the ill-disposed. Jehangir assented and endeavoured to withdraw, on pretence of dressing, to his female apartments, where he hoped to have an opportunity of consulting with Nur Jehan: being prevented from executing this design, he prepared himself where he was, and at first mounted a horse of his own in the midst of the Rajputs, who received him with respectful obeisances; but Mohabat reflecting that he would be in safer custody, as well as more conspicuous, on a elephant whose driver could be depended on, urged him to adopt that mode of conveyance, and placed him on one of those animals with two armed Rajputs by his side. At this moment the chief elephant-driver, attempting to force his way through the Rajputs, and to seat the emperor on an elephant of his own, was despatched on a sign from Mohabat. One of Jehangir's personal attendants who reached the elephant, not without a wound, was allowed to mount with his master, and the same permission was given to the servant who was intrusted with the bottle and goblet, so essential to Jehangir's existence.

These examples of the consequences of resistance had their full effect on the emperor; and he proceeded very tractably to the tents of Mohabat Khan.

Meanwhile Nur Jehan, though dismayed at this unexpected calamity, did not lose her presence of mind. When she found all access cut off to the emperor, she immediately put on a disguise and set out for the bridge in a litter of the most ordinary description. As the guards were ordered to let everyone pass, but permit no one to return, she crossed the river without obstruction, and was soon safe in the midst of the royal camp. She immediately sent for her brother and the principal chiefs, and bitterly reproached them with their cowardice and neglect in allowing their sovereign to be made a prisoner before their eyes. She

did not confine herself to invectives, but made immediate preparations to rescue her husband by force; and although Jehangir, probably in real apprehension of what might happen to himself in the confusion, sent a messenger with his signet to entreat that no attack might be made, she treated the message as a trick of Mohabat's, and only suspended her proceedings until she could ascertain the real position of the enemy's camp, and the part of it inhabited by the emperor. During the night a nobleman named Fedai Khan made an attempt to carry off Jehangir by swimming the river at the head of a small body of horse: his approach was discovered, and it was with difficulty he effected his escape, after losing several of his companions, killed and drowned in the river.

Next morning the whole army moved down to the attack. It was headed by Nur Jehan herself, who appeared on the howdah of a high elephant with a bow and two quivers of arrows. The bridge had been burnt by the Rajputs, and the army began to cross by a ford which they had discovered lower down the river. It was a narrow shoal between deep water, and full of dangerous pools, so that the passage was not effected without the utmost disorder; many were obliged to swim, and all landed with their powder wetted, with their drenched clothes and armour, and obliged to engage hand-to-hand before they could make good their footing on the beach. The Rajputs had the advantage of the ground; they poured down showers of balls, arrows, and rockets on the troops in the ford, and drove them back into the water sword in hand.

A scene of universal tumult and confusion ensued; the ford was choked with horses and elephants; some fell and were trampled under foot; others sank in the pools and were unable to regain the shoal. The most furious assault was directed on Nur Jehan. Her guards were overpowered and killed; balls and arrows fell thick round her howdah, and one of the latter wounded the infant daughter of Shehriar, who was seated in her lap. At length her driver was killed; and her elephant having received a cut on the proboscis, dashed into the river, and soon sank in deep water, and was carried down by the stream; after several plunges he swam out and reached the shore, where Nur Jehan was surrounded by her women, who found her howdah stained with blood, and herself busied in extracting the arrow, and binding up the wound of the infant.

Fedai Khan had made another attempt during the confusion of the battle to enter the enemy's camp at an unsuspected point, and had penetrated so far that his balls and arrows fell within the tent where Jehangir was seated; but the general repulse forced him also to retire. He effected his retreat, wounded, and with the loss of many of his men, and immediately retired to a neighbouring fort of which he was the governor.

Nur Jehan now saw that there was no hope of rescuing her husband by force; and she determined to join him in his captivity, and trust to fortune and her own arts for effecting his deliverance.

Mohabat Khan, after his success at the Hydaspes, advanced to Attok, where Asof Khan had retired. His authority was now so well established that it was recognised by most of the army; and Asof Khan, and such leaders as attempted to hold out, were obliged in the end to give themselves up as prisoners. The ascendancy of the Rajputs was offensive to the other troops; and, as the provinces were still faithful to the emperor, and two of his sons at large, Mohabat was obliged to use great management in his treatment of his prisoner, and to effect his objects by persuasion rather than by force or fear. Jehangir, tutored by Nur Jehan, took full advantage of the circumstances in which he was placed: he affected to enter into Mohabat's views with his usual facility; expressed himself pleased to be delivered from the thraldom in which he had been kept by Asof Khan; and even carried his duplicity so far as to warn Mohabat that he must not think Nur Jehan was as well disposed to him as he was himself. Mohabat was completely blinded by these artifices; and thinking himself sure of the emperor, he gave less heed to the designs of others.

During these proceedings the army advanced to Kabul; the neighbourhood of the Afghans made it necessary to increase the king's guard, and Nur Jehan seized the opportunity of getting persons in her interest to offer their services in such a way as to avoid suspicion. Jehangir was allowed, at this time, to go out to shoot on an elephant, always surrounded by Rajputs, and with one in particular, who stuck to him like his shadow, and never for a moment let him out of his sight. On one of these occasions an affray took place between the Rajputs with the emperor and some of the Ahdis, a select body of single horsemen, whose duty it was to attend on his majesty. The largest part of the escort being composed of Rajputs, the Ahdis were

overpowered, and several of them killed; and on their complaining to Mohabat, he said he would be happy to punish the offence if they could bring it home to any individuals. The Ahdis, incensed at this evasion, fell with their whole force on a body of Rajputs, killed many, and drove others into the hills, where they were made slaves by the Hazarehs. Mohabat himself was exposed to so much danger in this disturbance that he was forced to take refuge in the king's tent. Next day the ringleaders were punished; but a portion of the army was left in open enmity with the Rajputs, whose numbers were also diminished; and the Afghans of the neighbourhood showed every disposition to take part with the emperor. Nur Jehan could, therefore, pursue her schemes with less obstruction and less fear of detection. She employed agents to enlist fit men in scattered points at a distance, whence some were to straggle into camp as if in quest of service, while the others were to remain at their positions, and await her further orders. She next made Jehangir suggest a muster of all the troops of the jagirdars; and when she was summoned to produce her contingent, she affected to be indignant at being put on a level with an ordinary subject, and said she would take care that her muster should not turn out to her discredit. Accordingly she dressed out her old troops so as to make the smallness of their number conspicuous, entertained new levies as if to complete her contingent, and at the same time directed her recruits in the country to repair by twos and threes to the army. All this could not be done without some alarm to Mohabat Khan; but he was no longer able to crush opposition by force, and he suffered himself to be persuaded by Jehangir to avoid personal risk by forbearing to accompany him to the muster of Nur Jehan's contingent. Jehangir advanced alone to the review; and he had no sooner got to the centre of the lines than the troops closed in on him, cut off the Rajput horse, by whom he was guarded; and, being speedily joined by their confederates, rendered it impossible to make any attempt to seize his person. Mohabat Khan perceived that his power was irretrievably lost, and immediately withdrew to a distance with his troops, and entered on negotiation to procure his pardon and assurances of safety.

Jehangir was now restored to liberty, and Nur Jehan to power. Jehangir, soon after his deliverance,

marched back from Kabul to Lahore, and some time was spent in restoring every branch of the government to its old footing.

Jehangir died on a journey from Kashmir to Lahore, in the sixtieth year of his age.

Shah Jehan was proclaimed emperor at Agra, A.D. 1628, and the highest honours were conferred upon Mohabat. When firmly established in his government, Shah Jehan seems to have indemnified himself for his late fatigues and privations, by giving a loose to his passion for magnificent buildings and expensive entertainments. He was disturbed in these enjoyments by an irruption of the Uzbeks in Kabul: they ravaged the country and besieged the capital, but retired on the approach of a light force, followed up by an army under Mohabat Khan.

Mohabat had only reached Sirhind, on his way to Kabul, when the intelligence of the retreat of the Uzbeks was received. He was immediately recalled to the capital and directed to prepare for a march into the Deckan.

The most important occurrence of these times was the acquisition of Kandahar, the governor of which, Ali Merdan Khan, found himself exposed to so much danger from the tyranny of his sovereign the king of Persia, that he gave up the place to Shah Jehan, and himself took refuge at Delhi. He was received with great honour, and was afterwards, at different times, made governor of Kashmir and Kabul, and employed on various wars and other duties.

His military talents were first tried in an invasion of Balkh and Badakhshan. Those provinces had remained in the hands of the Uzbeks since they were lost by Mirza Soliman, and were now held by Nazar Mohammed, the younger brother of Imam Kali, sovereign of all the territory beyond the Oxus, from the Caspian Sea to Mount Imaus.

The revolt of Nazar Mahommed's son, Abdul Aziz, encouraged by his powerful uncle, tempted Shah Jehan, who had enjoyed several years of repose, to assert the dormant right of his family. Ali Merdan penetrated the range of Hindu Kush and ravaged Badakhshan; but the advance of the winter, and the

fear of being cut off from the southern countries, compelled him to retreat without having gained any solid advantage. Next year the enterprise was attempted by Raja Jagat Sing, whose chief strength lay in a body of 14,000 Rajputs, raised in his own country but paid by the emperor.

The spirit of the Rajputs never shone more brilliantly than in this unusual duty: they stormed mountain-passes, made forced marches over snow, constructed redoubts by their own labour, the raja himself taking an axe like the rest, and bore up against the tempests of that frozen region as firmly as against the fierce and repeated attacks of the Uzbeks.

But with all these exertions, the enterprise now appeared so arduous that Shah Jehan himself resolved to move to Kabul, and to send on his son Prince Morad, under the guidance of Ali Merdan Khan, with a large army into Balkh.*

This expedition was completely successful: Morad was joined by some of Nazar Mohammed's sons, and afterwards received the submission of that chief; but just as he had taken possession of the capital, a new rupture took place (with some suspicion of bad faith on the part of the Moguls), Nazar Mohammed, now divested of his defensible plans, was obliged to fly to Persia; and his dominions were annexed by proclamation to those of Shah Jehan. In 1647, the king again repaired to Kabul to support Prince Aurangzib, who, after obtaining a great victory over the Uzbeks, was so harassed by Abdul Aziz that Aurangzib was obliged to seek protection from the walls of Balkh itself.

The emperor Shah Jehan, perceiving how little his prospects were advanced by such an expenditure of blood and treasure, came to the prudent resolution of withdrawing from the contest. Aurangzib was directed to make over the places that remained in his possession; and he began his retreat from Balkh under continual attacks from the Uzbeks. When he reached the passes of Hindu Kush the Hazarehs joined in attacking him, and, to complete his misfortunes, the winter set in with violence; and though the prince himself reached Kabul with a light detachment, yet the main body of his army was intercepted by the snow, and

* Khafi Khan says 50,000 cavalry and 10,000 foot.

suffered so much in this helpless condition from the assaults of the Hazarehs, that they were glad to escape in separate bodies with the loss of all their baggage and almost all their horses.

The tranquillity purchased by the relinquishment of Balkh was first disturbed by an attack on Kandahar by the Persians. Shah Abbas II. assembled a large army and marched against Kandahar. He showed much judgment in beginning the siege in winter, when the communication between India and Kabul was cut off by the snow. The consequence was that, although Aurangzib was ordered off in haste from the Panjab, and although he made his way with great exertions through the mountains, he arrived too late to save Kandahar, which had been taken after a siege of two months and a half. The exhausted condition of the army after their winter march compelled Aurangzib to halt and refit at Kabul, while the king of Persia withdrew to Herat, leaving a strong garrison in Kandahar.

The Indian army came again before that city in May, 1649, and as the governor defended his town with as much skill as obstinacy, Aurangzib was constrained to raise the siege and commence his retreat to Kabul above four months after he had opened his batteries. Shah Jehan, who had followed Aurangzib to Kabul, marched from that city before the prince's return, and was not overtaken by him until he had reached Lahore.

In 1652 Aurangzib was again despatched to Kandahar, with a numerous and well-equipped army and ample provisions of tools and workmen to conduct all the operations of a siege.*

These great preparations were as unavailing as before; and Aurangzib, after exhausting every resource, was compelled to return to Kabul.

Dara Sheko, the eldest son of Shah Jehan, now entreated his father to allow him to try his skill and fortune at the siege of Kandahar, and was put at the head of an army much exceeding that formerly employed. It assembled at Lahore in the winter of 1652, and commenced its march in the spring of the next year, Shah Jehan himself following as usual to Kabul.

* It is worthy of remark, that, with so great a force assembled on purpose for a siege, there were only eight battering guns and twenty smaller pieces of ordnance.

Dara opened his trenches on a day and hour fixed by the astrologers. He began the siege on a scale proportioned to his armament. He mounted a battery of ten guns on a high and solid mound of earth, raised for the purpose of enabling him to command the town; and he pushed his operations with his characteristic impetuosity. He urged on the mines, directed the approaches, and the besieged having brought their guns to bear on his own tent, he maintained his position until their fire could be silenced by that of his artillery. But, after the failure of several attempts to storm, and the disappointment of near prospects of success, his mind appears to have given way to the dread of defeat and humiliation; he entreated his officers not to reduce him to a level with the twice-beaten Aurangzib; and he had recourse to magicians and other impostors, who promised to put him in possession of the place by supernatural means. Such expedients portended an unfavourable issue; and accordingly, after a last desperate assault, which commenced before daybreak, and in which his troops had at one time gained the summit of the rampart, he was compelled to renounce all hope, and to raise the siege, after having lost the flower of his army in the prosecution of it. He was harassed on his retreat both by the Persians and the Afghans, and it was not without additional losses that he made his way to Kabul, whence he pursued his march to Lahore.

Thus terminated the last attempt of the Moguls to recover Kandahar, of which they had held but a precarious possession from the first conquest of it by Baber.

Shah Jehan reigned thirty years; he was sixty-seven years old when he was deposed by Aurangzib, and seventy-four when he died.

All these vast undertakings were managed with so much economy that, after defraying the expenses of his great expeditions to Kandahar, his wars in Balkh, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 horse, Shah Jehan left a treasure, which some reckon at near six, and some at twenty-four millions sterling, in coin, besides his vast accumulations in wrought gold and silver, and in jewels.

In the reign of Aurangzib, who succeeded Shah Jehan as emperor, his attention was drawn to the increasing importance of a war which had for some time been going on with the north-eastern Afghans. It was always

a matter of difficulty to remain at peace with those tribes; but, as the communication with Kabul and other western countries lay through their lands, it was necessary to find some means of keeping them quiet. As Aurangzib was very jealous of his authority, and as he knew nothing of the structure of society among the Afghans, it is not unlikely that he suspected the chiefs of countenancing these irregularities underhand; but, from whatever cause it proceeded, he fell out with the whole of the tribes, even including the Eusofzais. This was the state of things in A.D. 1667, when Amin Khan, the son of the celebrated Mir Jumla, and the successor to his rank and title, was appointed governor of Kabul, and gained such success as for a time prevented the disturbance increasing, although they were never entirely suspended. But in A.D. 1670, the Afghans regained their superiority, defeated Amin Khan in a great battle, and totally destroyed his army: even his women and children fell into their hands, and were obliged to be redeemed by the payment of a ransom.

The Afghans, about the same time, set up a king, and coined money in his name.

The emperor at last determined to conduct the war in person. He marched to Hasan Abdal, and sent on his son, Prince Sultan, whom he had now released and intrusted with the command of an army. He probably was prevented going himself by the fear of committing his dignity in a strong country, where great blows could not be struck, and where great reverses might be sustained.

This war occupied Aurangzib for more than two years, and was carried on through his lieutenants after his own return to Delhi, until the increased disturbances in India, and the hopelessness of success, at length compelled him to be contented with a very imperfect settlement.

Aurangzib alone conducted every branch of his government, in the most minute detail. He planned campaigns and issued instructions during their progress; drawings of forts were sent to him to fix the point of attack; his letters embrace measures for keeping open the roads in the Afghan country, and even for recovering possession of Kandahar.

In 1694 he sent Prince Moazzim, who had been released after seven years' imprisonment, to the remote government of Kabul. He seems always to have regarded this prince with dislike and apprehension, and

constantly resisted his wishes to return, even for a time, and endeavoured to engage him in an expedition which might carry him to the most distant part of his province, and might completely absorb his resources.

Aurangzib expired on the 21st of February, A.D. 1707, in the eighty-ninth year of his life and fiftieth of his reign.

Before his death he drew up a sort of will, which was found inside his pillow. He there recommends that that Moazzim should be recognised as emperor, and that he and Prince Azim should divide the empire, one taking the northern and eastern provinces, with Delhi for his capital, and the other Agra, with all the country to the south and south-west.

As soon as Prince Azim heard of his father's death, he proclaimed himself sovereign of all India, in perfect disregard of the late emperor's will.

Prince Moazzim, with better reason, assumed the crown at Kabul, with the title of Bahadur Shah, and both brothers prepared to assert their pretensions by force of arms. They assembled very large armies, and met at length near Agra. A bloody battle ensued, in which Prince Azim and his two grown-up sons were killed. Bahadur Shah showed indulgence towards the adherents of Azim Shah, but his confidence was chiefly reposed in Monim Khan, who had been his own principal officer at Kabul, and was now appointed vizir.

In the reign of Mohammed Shah the empire was again reduced to the same state of decay which had on former occasions invited the invasion of Tamerlane and Baber; and a train of events in Persia led to a similar attack from that country.

The western tribes of Afghanistan were the actors in the revolution in Persia. Their country is on the high table-land, which is supported on the east by the mountains of Soliman, and separated by them from the plain of the Indus. The part of this table-land westward belongs to the Persians, and that eastward of the same city to the Afghans.

There are fertile plains in this tract, and on the most extensive of them are the cities of Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, and Herat. In the pastoral tracts, the Afghans are almost unmixed; but a great part of the

population of the plains, including the cities, consists of Tajiks, who speak Persian, and are the same people that occupy similar situations in Persia and Transoxiana.

The plains alone formed the conquests of the Persian and Indian kings. The Afghan tribes remained independent. The greatest of the western tribes were the Ghiljeis, who inhabited the country round Kandahar, and the Abdalis, whose original seat was in the mountains of Ghor.

During the reign of Shah Hosen, the Ghiljeis had given such offence to Persia as to provoke a formidable expedition against them. Gurgin Khan, the prince of Georgia, was sent to Kandahar with an army of upwards of 20,000 men, a force his opponents were unable to withstand. The Ghiljeis were headed by their chief Mir Weis, a man of talents and enterprise, and well aware of the feeble condition of the Persian empire. In 1708 Mir Weis surprised Kandahar, and expelled the Persians from the surrounding country. This achievement was followed by repeated attempts of the Persians to recover Kandahar. In A.D. 1716, the Abdalis joined the Ghiljeis, and took Herat and overran the greater part of Persian Khorasan.

Mir Weis had died in A.D. 1715, and was at first succeeded by his brother; but his son, whose name was Mahmud, before long seized on the government, and planned the invasion of Persia.

Mahmud left Kandahar with 25,000 men, and captured the city of Isfahan after a siege of six months. The king surrendered himself to Mahmud, and with his own hand placed the diadem on the head of the conqueror. Mahmud had not reigned two years when he died, or was put to death, and was succeeded by his nephew, Ashref (April 1724).

The new king was a man of talents and vigour. Before he had completed the conquest of Persia, he was assailed at once by the Persians and Turks, who had entered into a confederacy for dismembering the kingdom.

But Ashref's most formidable enemy was now rising nearer home. Tahmasp, the son of Hosen, had fled from Isfahan, and had remained under the protection of the tribe of Kajar, with nothing of the royal dignity but the name. The first sign of a change of fortune was his being joined by Nadir Culi, the greatest

warrior Persia has ever produced. This chief, who had first collected troops as a freebooter, now appeared as the deliverer of his country.

His first exploits were the capture of Meshhed and recovery of Khorasan from the Abdalis. He afterwards engaged the Ghiljeis under Ashref, and utterly routed and dispersed them. Most of their number were killed in the war or perished in the desert on their return home. Ashref was murdered by a Beloch chief between Kirman and Kandahar (January 1729).

Nadir next marched against the Turks, and afterwards took Herat from the Abdalis, after a siege of ten months.

In 1736 Nadir was offered the crown of Persia, which he accepted on condition that the Shia religion should be abolished, and that of Sunnis established throughout Persia. Nadir now felt that a throne established by a succession of victories must be maintained by similar achievements: he therefore determined to gratify the pride of his countrymen by retaliating on their former conquerors the Ghiljeis, and restoring Kandahar to the Persian monarchy.

He made great preparations for this expedition, and set out on it at the head of an army estimated at 80,000 men. But it was not till after a close blockade of nearly a twelvemonth that Nadir ventured on an assault of Kandahar: even then he was more than once repulsed before the city fell into his hands (March 1738).

While engaged in the siege of Kandahar, he had applied to the court of Delhi for the seizure or expulsion of some Afghans who had fled into the country near Ghazni. The Indian government was probably unable to comply with this demand, and they seem also to have had some hesitation in acknowledging Nadir Shah's title: for these reasons they allowed a long period to elapse without returning an answer. Nadir Shah remonstrated in strong terms against this neglect of his application, and without further delay advanced on Ghazni and Kabul. Another messenger whom he now despatched to Delhi, having been cut off by the Afghans in the mountains, Nadir thought himself fully justified in an invasion of

India. Kabul had fallen into his hands with little difficulty; but he remained in that neighbourhood for some months for the purpose of settling the country, and did not commence his march to the eastward till near the approach of winter. As long as he was engaged in a contest within the old territory of Persia, the court of Delhi looked on with total indifference; and even when he had invaded their own territory and taken Kabul, they still expected that the mountain tribes between that city and Peshawur would check his further advance. It was, therefore, with dismay that the Moguls learned that Nadir had passed the mountains, had defeated a small force under one of their governors, had thrown a bridge of boats over the Indus, and was advancing into the Panjab.

It is unnecessary here to recount the invasion of India by Nadir Shah, his capture and plunder of the city of Delhi and massacre of the inhabitants. The latter part of his life was more like that of a madman than a sane person. His conduct became that of an open enemy of his species. His cruelties were equalled by his extortions, and both were accompanied by expressions of hatred against his subjects. These expressions led to revolts, which drew on fresh enormities; whole cities were depopulated, and towers of heads raised to commemorate their ruin: eyes were torn out, tortures inflicted; and no man could count for a moment on his exemption from death in torments. During the last two years of his life, his rage was increased by bodily sickness, until it partook of frenzy, and until his subjects were compelled to lay plots for ridding themselves of the tyrant. In his distrust of his countrymen, he had entertained a body of Uzbek mercenaries, and he had thrown himself without reason on the Afghans, taking a pleasure in mortifying his old soldiers by a marked preference of their former enemies.

Notwithstanding these precautions, he was assassinated at midnight in his tent by a number of the conspirators, among whom were the captain of his guard and the chief of his own tribe of Afshar, and he expired—'the boast, the terror, and the execration of his country.'

On the next morning an attack was made on the Persians by the Afghans under the command of

Ahmed Khan Abdali, who was joined by the Uzbeks. It was made in the hope of being still in time to rescue the Shah, but, considering the inferiority of the numbers of the Afghans, they may be reckoned fortunate in making good their retreat to their own country, near the frontier of which the death of Nadir took place.

II.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF KABUL.

AHMED KHAN was crowned king of the Afghans at Kandahar in October 1747. Scarcely had he been crowned than he appealed to the national spirit. Kabul and Ghazni were yet in Persian hands,—Kabul and Ghazni must be united to the fatherland, whence they had been severed. The governor of Kabul at this time was the same Nazir Khan who had held the province for the Mogol when it had been invaded by Nadir Shah. Summoned by Ahmed to yield the government, Nazir Khan replied by proclaiming the Mogol. Meanwhile Ahmed Shah advanced. At his approach the commandant of Ghazni fled. That fortress was occupied without a shot. Kabul cost but a few lives. After a brief resistance, Nazir Khan hastily retreated and fell back on Peshawur, harassed by the mountain tribes. Thither Ahmed Shah followed, and thence drove him.

In the spring of the following year, Ahmed Shah marched against Herat with 25,000 men. Herat succumbed after a siege of fourteen days, and was united to the Afghan kingdom.

In 1756, the court of Delhi, considering the circumstances favourable for the recovery of the Panjab, sent an army to Lahore, and left there Adina Beg, a man famous for his power of intrigue, as governor for the Mogol. Ahmed Shah replied to this insult by marching first to Lahore, whence he drove Adina Beg, and thence towards Delhi. Ahmed Shah marched on and occupied Delhi, 1757. Again did the Mogol capital suffer the terrible misery of occupation by a barbarous enemy. Delhi then suffered as much as if had been taken by assault, and plunder, pillage, and rapine went hand in hand. Those who had escaped the massacre of 1739 had cause to remember the not less terrible occupation of eighteen years later.

On the 6th January, 1761, Ahmed Shah, with a force estimated at 40,000 men, fought and gained the third battle of Panipat. This, one of the decisive battles of the age, has been often described. At the height of the battle, whilst the Marattas were still resisting the Afghan charge, their chief Wiswas Rao, the son of Peshwa, fell mortally wounded. The fall of their chief unnerved them. They renounced the empire of India when it was still within their grasp. The defeat of the Marattas at Panipat placed Hindustan at the feet of the Afghans.

Ahmed Shah died, in 1773, at a palace he had built at Toba Maharaj, in the Soliman mountains. He was succeeded by Taimur Shah, his second son, although Taimur's eldest brother Sulaiman had himself proclaimed king at Kandahar.

Sulaiman's triumph was short. Taimur, supported by the great majority of the Duranis, Harazas, and Aimuks, marched at once upon Kandahar. The Grand Vizir attempted to raise an army to support his son-in-law, but failing, resolved to make a virtue of submission. Accordingly, accompanied by his two sons, and two Durani chiefs whose adherence to him had been conspicuous, he rode into Taimur's camp at Farrah. Taimur thoroughly understood those over whom he had to rule, and to inaugurate that rule by forgiveness would be an encouragement to rebellion. Refusing, then, to see them, he ordered their heads to be struck off. This act of severity had the desired effect. Taimur Shah entered Kandahar in triumph, and was crowned king of the Afghans.

Taimur paid special attention to his finances, placing them upon a well-ordered basis. His own expenses were small, and the revenue was regularly collected. The consequence was a full treasury. Taimur had not the same passion for war as his father, and governed his rude country, internally, as few men have governed it. Yet his peaceful instincts unfortunately affected its influence with the outer world. The provinces annexed from other countries, feeling no longer the heel of the conqueror, began to think they might walk alone. The province of Sind revolted, and about the same time Multan was gained by the Sikhs. Against these enemies Shah Taimur moved in person, at the head of a well-organized army.

He defeated the Sikhs near Multan, took that place after a few days' siege, and then marched on Bahawulpur, which, with all its wealth, fell into his hands. Taimur returned to Kabul. But he had not reached that place before the insurrection in Sind broke out with renewed fury. Other affairs prevented him from marching at once to quell it, and it was only five years later, in 1786, that he sent his commander-in-chief with a small force to suppress it.

Taimur's reign was not entirely free from internal rebellion. The first of these revolts, made by a relative, Abdul Halik Khan, was easily repulsed. Nearly five years later, when Taimur was at Peshawur, an attempt was made to murder him with a view of seating his brother Sikander on the throne. The conspirators were nearly succeeding; they had murdered the guards of the palace, and driven Taimur to take refuge in its upper story, before the royal troops could assemble to attack them. But then the conspirators were nearly all cut to pieces.

In the latter months of his life, Taimur became more and more morose than he had been before. He survived the last attempt upon his life about thirteen months. Taken ill as he was journeying from Peshawur to Kabul, he died at the latter place on the 20th May, 1793. His reign had lasted twenty years.

Taimur Shah left twenty-three sons and thirteen daughters. The fifth son, Zaman Mirza, had enlisted on his behalf the all-powerful influence of the zenana. The result was that, at a meeting after the interment of Taimur Shah, Shah Zaman was chosen to succeed him; his first act was to secure the throne to which he had been elected.

Recognised as king by everyone except by his brothers, he at once placed those of the recusants who were at Kabul in confinement, and fed them for four days on an allowance of two or three ounces of bread for each individual daily. This starvation diet had its effect. On the sixth day the princes, having recognised their brother as sovereign, were freed from confinement, only however to be lodged under careful surveillance in the Bala Hissar.

In this brief sketch it would be impossible to narrate the varied events that occurred during the Durani rule, and the Barukzye period, from 1802 until the British invasion in 1838.

From 1823 to 1834, Dost Mahomed was lord of Kabul and of Ghazni. To these he subsequently added Jalalabad.

In 1838 the British Government determined to restore Shah Shujah to the throne of his ancestors, and to depose Dost Mahomed, at that time Amir. Shah Shujah, with a force of 6000 men, left Ferozepur for Shikarpur early in December 1838. He was accompanied by Mr. Macnaghten of the Bengal Civil Service, who had been appointed envoy at his court.

On the 10th December, the Bengal column, under Sir Willoughby Cotton, proceeded by the same route for the same destination.

Sir John Keane, on his side, had entered Sind early in the same month, with the Bombay contingent. By incredible exertion he moved on his force to Tatta, forty-eight miles from Haiderabad. The Amirs now changed their system. From professions of friendship combined with obstruction, they proceeded to open hostilities. Sir John Keane, continuing his march, they cut off his supplies and harassed his communications. Sending then a message to Sir Willoughby Cotton, then at Rori, to support him, he prepared, in the last days of January, 1839, to assault the capital. The Amirs, observing this, yielded, and promised the Political Agent to agree to all the demands of the British Government. Thenceforth all difficulties disappeared, and, on the 10th February, Sir John Keane resumed his march northwards. On the 23rd February, one brigade of the Bengal column traversed the Bolan Pass, and reached Quetta on the 5th March. A month later he was joined by Shah Shujah and his levies.

The Bombay force entered the Bolan Pass on the 9th and 11th April, and pushed on in the same direction. Anxious to secure the Kojak Kotul, Sir John Keane moved forward from Quetta on the 7th April. The enemy made scarcely any attempt to utilise the great natural advantages offered by the Pass. A handful of their horsemen indeed appeared, but a few shots dispersed them. From this point the march

to Kandahar was easy and unopposed. The army appeared before that city on the 25th of April, and at once entered it. The army stayed at Kandahar until its component parts should be reunited and rested.

On the 27th June, Sir John Keane, leaving a strong garrison in Kandahar, pursued his way up the valley of the Turnak towards Ghazni. Ghazni was reached on the 21st July. The British force consisted of 8000 men; the Shah's contingent to 4000; they had in all forty field guns. They found the fortress occupied by Prince Haidar, a son of the Amir, with a garrison of 3500 men. Ghazni was, in many respects, a strong place; proof, if well commanded, against a *coup de main;* but not capable of sustaining a siege. For a siege Sir John Keane had neither the time nor the guns of requisite calibre. But he had good troops and skilled engineers, so he resolved, on the 23rd, to attempt a *coup de main.* He succeeded. Four officers of the Engineers, prominent among whom was Lieutenant, afterwards Sir Henry Durand, were told off to blow open the Kabul gate, the weakest part of the fortress, and storming parties were held in readiness to profit by the explosion. The daring scheme succeeded; Ghazni was carried, and her garrison was taken prisoners.

The sudden fall of Ghazni spread consternation among the Barukzyes. Sir John Keane took advantage of this feeling, by pressing on at once towards the capital. Leaving Ghazni on the 30th July, he reached Kabul without opposition on the 6th August. The same evening Shah Shujah made his triumphal entrance into the capital, and took up his residence in the Bala Hissar.

Where, in the meanwhile, was the Amir Dost Mahomed? and what had he been doing? Unable to avert the invasion, he resolved, with the spirit of a true Barukzye, to resist it. He accordingly repaired the fortifications of the Bala Hissar; strengthened those of Ghazni; sent his son Haidar to command the latter fortress; his son Azul with a force to lie in its neighbourhood, and fall upon the English when Haidar should repulse them; his son Akbar to guard the Khyber; whilst he himself would be prepared to take up a position between Ghazni and Kabul to act according to circumstances.

We have seen how matters went against him,—how Ghazni fell almost without a blow. Then Afzul, paralysed by the fall of the fortress, abandoned his elephants and his camp-equipage, and fled to Kabul. What was now the Amir to do? He resolved to treat, yielding all that he could yield. He despatched his brother Jabbar Khan to the British camp, offering to resign everything to Shah Shujah provided that the Shah would confirm him in the office of Vizir. But the proposition was refused. In reply, he was offered the 'honourable asylum' at Ludiana, which Shah Shujah had quitted to assail him. The Amir declined the offer, and resolved, as a last resource, to try the supreme appeal. Not that he cherished any hope of victory. He knew that he was overmatched. But he would at least die with his face to the enemy, fighting for his right. But even this last consolation was denied him. The attitude and demeanour of the Afghan lords showed plainly that imagination had quenched their courage, that they were beaten before they had fought. Then, and then only, rather than fall into the hands of the invaders, he resolved to fly. Deserted by his nobles, left with scarcely 2000 followers, the Amir mounted his horse and galloped off in the direction of Bamian.

Amongst the English officers present, was Captain James Outram, then in the full promise of a glorious career. He at once volunteered to command any party that might be placed at his disposal to pursue the Amir. Some ten or twelve other officers volunteered to accompany him.* .It was decided to employ a body of Afghan horse commanded by one Hafi Khan Khakar. This man was a deserter from the Barukzyes, and he accepted the commission to pursue Dost Mahomed, with the intention of saving him from capture. He did save him. He knew the country, the roads, the passes. The English officers did not know them. He thus managed that the Amir should be thirty miles from Bamian when the pursuers reached that place. Outram had orders not to proceed beyond Bamian. The Amir was then able to make his escape to Bokhara.

It had been decided that while two limbs of the triple alliance, the British and Shah Shujah, should

* Amongst the survivors of these is General Sir George Lawrence, K.C.S.I.

invade Afghanistan by the Bolan Pass, the third, the Sikhs, accompanied by Taimur Nazir, a son of the Shah, should penetrate into it by the Khyber.

The contingent provided by Ranjit Singh amounted to about 5000 troops, mostly Pathans. Accompanying them as Political Agent was Captain Wade, and naturally, and notwithstanding the presence of the Sadozye prince, the chief direction of the expedition devolved upon the senior English officer present, Captain Wade. Wade entered the Khyber, and marched cautiously on Ali Musjid. He encountered a fitful but ineffective opposition, and, with a loss of 180 men killed and wounded, he occupied that fortress on the fifth day (26th July), after leaving Peshawur.

The subsequent events that happened at Kabul, from 1839 to 1841,—the treacherous murder of the Envoy, and the disastrous retreat of the British army from Kabul in the winter of 1841, are fully related in Kaye's *Afghanistan*, Malleson's *Afghanistan*, *The Kabul Insurrection* by Sir Vincent Eyre, and in the works of many other eminent writers, and are too well known to require to be recapitulated. Of the 15,000 men who composed General Elphinstone's army that marched from Kabul at the end of 1841, of whom only 5000 were fighting men and the remainder camp-followers, but one man (Dr. Brydon) escaped to tell the tale. The remainder were killed, or died of cold and starvation, in the passes between Kabul and Gundamuk.

The unhappy Shah Shujah did not long survive the destruction of the supports on which he had so long rested. Enticed out of his palace, on the 4th of April, by the fierce feudal chiefs raised by the successful insurrection to the summit of affairs, he was waylaid and shot dead.

At the latter end of 1841 rumours were current in India that the inhabitants of Afghanistan had risen *en masse*, and beaten our troops on more than one occasion. Early in 1842 General Sir George Pollock was at Peshawur with a large force, and successfully forced the Khyber Pass and proceeded on to Jalalabad to relieve General Sale, who was hard pressed by Akban Khan. The Khyberees fought well, but were driven back. The 9th regiment particularly distinguished itself on this occasion, in which they were ably seconded

by the 26th N. I., and some other corps. The loss of the Khyberees was very great, particularly from the artillery fire, and they sustained a severe defeat. Colonel Mosely was sent forward with two native regiments to occupy the fort of Ali Musjid, and succeeded in capturing the fort. The Khyberees, however, assembled in great numbers to prevent his return. Retreat was inevitable, and to be effected at all hazards, as the two days' provisions which the troops had been ordered to take with them were exhausted. Of this the Khyberees were aware, and they watched him closely. The retreat was commenced under a murderous fire from the jezails of the Afreedis, who swarmed on every height commanding the Pass. The loss was severe, but eventually the force effected its junction with the main body at Jumrood.

In May, 1842, General Pollock's army was concentrated at Jalalabad. It consisted of H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons, 1st and 10th Native Cavalry, and Tait's Irregular Horse; Infantry, H.M.'s 9th, 13th, and 31st Regiments, 6th, 26th, 33rd, 36th, 38th, 53rd, 60th, and 64th N.I.; three batteries of Horse Artillery and mountain train; a company of Sappers, Jezailchees, and Mackeson's bildars: in all about 10,000 fighting men and 50,000 camp-followers. General Pollock's force marched from Jalalabad on the 23rd August, and halted a week at Futtehabad to collect provisions. From this place the army proceeded in two divisions: the second, under the command of General McCaskill, was small in proportion to that commanded by General Pollock in person.

The first division, which comprised four-fifths of the whole strength of the army, marched from Gundamuk on the 16th of September, 1842; the second followed on the 7th, and, in consequence of its numerical inferiority, was subjected continually to the furious attacks of the savage tribes who defended the road; while the other, in the most part from its invincible appearance, overawed them. The force moved off towards Jugdulluk on the following morning soon after daybreak. The first three miles of the road is over a range of hills by a winding and narrow rocky path. It then continues for about eight miles through a formidable pass. The Ghilzais attacked the third division on the way, and kept up a running fight through the whole march. The Jugdulluk Pass, in which the remains of Elphinstone's army were destroyed, has been often described. There is

a steep descent into the mouth of it, and the narrow and formidable gorge is veiled in gloom and darkness. The Pass is exceedingly narrow, in some places being not more than ten feet broad, and scarcely allows room for a single camel with its burden. Here the remains of the poor fellows who fell in the disastrous retreat from Kabul lay in heaps. It was impossible for the men composing Pollock's army to avoid treading upon the bodies. The caves on either side were also full. As the army proceeded through the Pass they were fired upon by the Ghilzais, who had collected on the heights. An action now commenced, but the Afghans, having been disheartened by the loss they had sustained during the former part of the march, soon gave way. The next morning the march was continued to Kuttasung. The enemy annoyed the column by firing from the heights, but without causing much loss. During this march the second division of Pollock's army passed the barricade which the Afghans had built across the road to intercept the retreat of the late unfortunate army. The men of the Horse Artillery had made a furious charge against the barricade, and were all killed in the attempt to force it. The enemy had of course removed their own slain; but Akbar Khan, it is believed, himself allowed that five thousand of his men had fallen in the pursuit of the worn-out and starved army of General Elphinstone, the greater part of whom, having no ammunition, had to use the butt-ends of their firelocks as the only means of defence.

Fifteen thousand men had fallen between Kabul and Gundumuk; but not above five thousand of the number were fighting men, the remainder being composed of camp-followers and sick and wounded European soldiers, who could not use their arms. The greater part of these perished in the snow about the passes of Koord Kabul and Tezeen. But one man of the whole army escaped, Dr. Brydon, who, although severely wounded, managed to get into Jalalabad bearing the news of the disaster to the garrison. The second division, under an express order from General Pollock, made a forced march of the next two regular marches, and joined him in the valley of Tezeen. The artillery horses were knocked up, and our men had to drag the guns nearly the whole way. The enemy disputed the ground the whole way, and made several attacks on the baggage, in all of which, however, they were repulsed with loss.

On the following day the Afghans made an attack, and penetrated some way into the camp. They were, however, met by the Jezailchees,* who quickly drove them back.

The following morning the advanced guard, under the command of Sir Robert Sale, moved towards Kabul. The march was of a severe description, being for the first four miles through the Tezeen Pass, a defile of most formidable character, and over seven hills, the last of which, by name the Huft Kotul,† is 7800 feet above the sea. The paths were narrow and difficult, in many places mere goat-tracks, with yawning precipices on either side, down which many of the baggage animals fell and were lost. The advanced guard moved forward in column of sections, and entered the Pass without seeing any indication of an enemy; but when they had proceeded about two miles in the defile, they were met by a heavy fire from the enemy, who lined the hills in great force. The 13th Regiment ascended and stormed the heights on the right, and the 9th and 31st those on the left. The fire was exceedingly hot, and the enemy very numerous, and seemed disposed to fight to the last for the possession of the heights.

On arriving at the top, our men fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. The Afghans at first stood manfully, being encouraged by their leaders, but were driven down the hill. The loss, on our side in taking this important post, was much less than could have been expected, and the casualties were few. Our troops having broken the Afghans, kept them on the run along the heights which are generally in continuous ridges the whole length of the Pass.

The heights now occupied by our troops were commanded by other hills, that were from our position perfectly inaccessible, and from which the Afghans, in number about 10,000, kept up a most incessant and galling cross fire. At a particular part of the Pass where an opening appeared for the use of artillery, our troops were ordered to lie down, which being obeyed, the howitzers threw shrapnel shells above their heads, among the Afghans who lined the heights above. The Afghans had a large body of cavalry in the field, who were charged and utterly overthrown by H.M. 3rd Dragoons and the 1st Light Cavalry. The

* Afghan riflemen in British pay.

† From two Persian words: *huft*, seven, and *kotul*, a pass.

Afghans having been completely routed by the advanced guard and main column, moved to the rear, and made a furious attack on the rear-guard. Here they were received by Colonel Richmond of the 33rd N.I., who commanded, in a most masterly manner; and in a short time, finding the day was lost, the hostile army dispersed by different mountain tracks. Akber Khan made his escape from the field with great difficulty, with a few followers. The loss of the enemy in this battle was about fifty chiefs and seven hundred men killed, and about double that number wounded; our casualties were only about one hundred and eighty-five. Our troops arrived at Koord Kabul late at night.

On the following day the line moved off towards the Pass of Koord Kabul. The entrance of this defile is about a mile from the encamping ground, in the valley of the same name. This defile, which is almost impregnable, is bounded on both sides by stupendous rocks towering to a vast height one over the other. Enormous masses of rock project over the Pass, by the loosening of which a few men from above would be able to cause destruction to troops passing the defile.

Akber Khan had decided originally to meet our army here, and to decide the fate of Kabul. He had neglected no artificial means to render the natural difficulties of the way still more impregnable. Strong barricades of stone were erected across the path between the heights; and on these themselves sungah surmounted sungah, from under cover of which a most destructive fire might be kept up on all parts of the Pass by the defenders. The Pass is very winding, so that at every turn all sides of an invading army are assailable at once. A river runs along the Pass, which the army crossed six-and-twenty times during the day's march. Akber Khan's judgment was, however, overruled by the turbulent spirits under him.

When the halt in the Tezeen Valley was forced upon our army by the condition of the cattle, the Afghans, who were carefully watching our movements, attributed it either to hesitation or fear. Khodabux Khan, the chief of Tezeen, sent word to Akber that the British force had suffered considerably in our previous engagements, and were reduced to such extremities that we could neither advance nor retreat, and that therefore he ought to come down, and, concentrating his whole force for the attack, to fall upon the English at Tezeen. Akber

reluctantly complied with the command of his chiefs, and, moving from his stronghold, met our army in the Tezeen Pass and Huft Kotul. The result was the utter annihilation of his army. So great was the panic excited among the Afghans by the events of that day, that the passage through the most difficult Pass of the whole was undisputed. Only a few shots were fired at the rear-guard. The force marched through the Koord Kabul Pass to Bhutkak, and the following day encamped about three miles from the city of Kabul, which was deserted by the greater number of the inhabitants, who had also removed most of their valuables when they heard the result of the battle of Tezeen. Sir Richmond Shakespear proceeded, with a body of about eight hundred Kuzilbashes, to a fort some marches off, and was fortunate enough to recover the whole of the prisoners taken by the Afghans from the late unfortunate force, with the exception of Captain Bygrave, who was very generously sent back a few days afterwards by Akber Khan. The Bala Hissar was taken possession of by a detachment from the different regiments of the army, the day after their arrival, and the British flag hoisted on the ramparts. Many brass and iron cannon, very beautifully ornamented, in all about eighty pieces, were found inside.

A few days after the capture of Kabul, General Nott arrived with the Kandahar army. He had retaken the fortress of Ghazni, and beaten the enemy in several obstinate engagements. Shortly after his arrival, a division, composed partly of his, and partly of General Pollock's army, proceeded to Istaliff, where an Afghan army of some strength was lying, and under guard of which a great number of the inhabitants of Kabul had collected their families and valuables. The Afghan army was utterly overthrown, and the city, with a large quantity of valuables and a great number of women and children, fell into the hands of McCaskill's division. A guard was placed over the females and children, and they were as safely protected in the European camp as if they had been among their own friends. Negotiations were entered into with one of the Afghan chiefs, to whom they were all safely delivered over without ransom.

In the middle of October the army of General Pollock, after first destroying a portion of the city with some of the principal streets and buildings, received orders for its return march to India. During the

return march there was also fighting. About two thousand cripples who had been found in Kabul, and who had been Sepoys and camp-followers with Elphinstone's army, accompanied the force mounted upon elephants, bullocks, donkeys, and every beast of burden that it found possible to procure. Most of these unfortunate people had lost their feet or hands from frost-bites, and had subsisted after the departure of the army by begging from the inhabitants of Kabul. At Tezeen the main column and rear-guard were attacked in the Pass in the darkness by the enemy in force, with the hope of being able to plunder the baggage. The Afghans were repulsed with great loss, without capturing a single baggage animal. General Nott, who commanded the rear division, had also a severe engagement here, but the enemy were completely defeated. He was, however, obliged to burst his eighteen-pounder guns, which he had brought with him from Kandahar, it being found impossible to drag them through the passes. At Jugdulluk the army was again attacked. The Afghans remained almost inactive until the rear-guard appeared in the Pass, when they made a furious attack upon the baggage. Many and desperate were the attacks which they made on the long line of camels; but owing to the judicious position in which parties had been detached in various parts along the Pass, they were repulsed in all their attempts with great loss. At Futtiabad the Afghans allowed the advance and main column to pass unmolested, but attacked the rear-guard. General Sale, pretending to retreat in a disorderly manner, the Afghans followed the troops across an open plain. No sooner had they come so far than a troop of cavalry, which formed part of the rear-guard, making a dash, got in rear of the enemy, completely cutting them off from their village. The infantry forming in front, the Afghans now found themselves in a trap, and were cut down in great numbers by the cavalry, and received one of the most severe lessons of the war.

After four days' halt at Jalalabad, the fort and town were set fire to and completely destroyed. The army returned to Peshawur through the Khyber. General McCaskill's division having been benighted in the Pass, was attacked on all sides by the Khyberees in the darkness; a heavy loss of baggage and two guns was experienced, and many officers and men were killed or wounded. The guns were re-captured the

next day. General Nott, who was in rear of all, was also furiously attacked, but defeated the enemy with great loss. On the 1st of November the force arrived at Peshawur. During the return march the men were very sickly from the hardships and privations they had undergone; and the mortality was very great, especially from dysentery.

Thus ended the war in Afghanistan of 1839–42. An unwearied career of success had marked the march of General Pollock's army on Kabul. The prisoners in the hands of the Afghans had all been rescued in safety; every city of importance that they possessed had been taken and destroyed, and Akbar Khan was himself a fugitive, with scarcely a single follower.

Dost Mahomed was awarded an annual income of two lakhs of rupees. He was allowed to reside at Mussooree, and was summoned on the 25th of October, 1842, by order of Lord Ellenborough, to return to his native country as soon as the armies of Pollock and Nott should have recrossed the Indus. He returned; was received by Shir Shingh, king of Lahore, with respect; then prosecuting his journey to Kabul, entered that city, and quietly resumed the office of which nearly three years previously the British had deprived him.

The first seven years following the return of the Amir may be described as politically uneventful.

His father's murderer, the infamous Kamran of Herat, was himself murdered that same year, 1842, by his not less infamous minister, Yar Mahomed.

The year following the annexation of the Panjab by the British, the Amir crossed the Hindu Kush to reassert Afghan authority in the provinces south of the Oxus. In this expedition he entirely succeeded, and thenceforth could reckon Afghan Turkistan and Badakshan as integral portions of his dominions.

In 1854 the intrigues of Persia so affected Dost Mahomed, that they caused him to forget his enmity to the British, and opening negotiations with them, he agreed to detach his son, Gholam Hyder Khan, to conclude a treaty of alliance with his ancient enemies. Gholam Hyder came to Peshawur. The Government of India was then represented by the Chief Commissioner, afterwards Lord Lawrence. The articles of this

treaty were but three in number. The first provided 'for the perpetual peace and friendship between the Amir of Kabul and his heirs on one side, and the East India Company on the other.' By the second the Company engaged to respect the Afghan territory, and never to interfere with them. By the third the Amir entered into a like engagement with respect to the territory of the Company, and promised in addition to be the friend of the friends, and enemy of the enemies, of the Honourable East India Company.

If the Amir had hoped that his alliance with England would put an immediate stop to Persian intrigues he was disappointed. These intrigues continued, and culminated in the march of a Persian army to Herat, and by the surrender of the city to that army in October 1856. But the British alliance was not useless. On the 1st of November following the English Government declared war against Persia, and followed up that declaration by the despatch of a fleet and army to the Persian Gulf. The operation was successful, and Persia, beaten on her own territory, was humiliated.

On the 4th of March, 1857, the representatives of the Shah signed at Paris an agreement by which the Shah pledged himself to renounce all claims of sovereignty over Herat and over Afghanistan.

Thrice since 1855–56 has Afghanistan been broken up into a number of warring factions and antagonistic states. In 1856 Dost Mahomed, the ablest prince since the days of Ahmed Shah Abdali, was master of no more than Kabul and its vicinity, including Ghazni, the Khyber, and Afghan Turkestan. Even Kelat i Ghilzai defied his authority. Kandahar was ruled by the Kohundil Khan family, and Herat was still faithful to the Suddozye dynasty. Not until the year 1856 did Amir Dost Mahomed win Kandahar. Herat was conquered only a year before the Dost's death. Yet on the failure of the first Afghan war Dost Mahomed returned to Kabul with all the prestige of a patriot who had endured much wrong at the hands of infidel invaders. He was the most popular as well as the most able man in Afghanistan, and still it cost him the labour of a lifetime to weld his disjointed state into a compact whole.

The second period of disruption and anarchy was covered by the first five years after the Dost's death. During which his successor, Shere Ali, was engaged in incessant warfare with his brothers. Thrice in two years, namely,

in 1866 and 1867, at Shekabad and Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and at Killah Alladad, Shere Ali received apparently crushing defeats. Afghan Turkestan was in the hands of Afzul Khan and his son, the present Amir of Kabul. Kurrum and Khost were in revolt, or subject to Asim Khan. Yet Shere Ali succeeded in the end, and under him Afghanistan assumed not the semblance only, but also the reality, of unity.

In 1739 the invasion of India by Nadir Shah afforded to Mohbut Khan, the ruler of Kelat, the opportunity of rendering great services to the Persian monarch. In the reign of Ahmad Shah, Nadir's successor, in consequence of the tyrannical conduct of Mohbut, Nasir, his brother, is said to have assassinated him, and, with the consent of the Shah, Nasir Khan assumed the reins of government, and he became ruler of the Khanate of Kelat.

Nasir Khan reigned forty years, and died in 1795. No succeeding ruler of Kelat has ever equalled Nasir I. in power of administration, or in the wide sway exercised by him.

In 1838 the Indian Government having resolved to restore Shah Shujah to the Afghan throne, intercourse between the British and the Khan of Kelat took place early in that year, as a preparatory measure to the passage of the troops through his dominion.

The march of the columns through the Kachi and the Bolan to Quetta was attended with constant harassing by the warlike tribes on all sides of the routes and passes. The most daring raids and attacks were made on detached parties and on the baggage trains, causing loss of life and general obstruction. So straitened were the troops that they were placed on half rations, and the cavalry suffered severely; and at one time it was a question whether the army had not better give up the expedition and retire. In addition to these hostile acts, Mehrab Khan, the ruler of Kelat, through arrogance or suspicion, declined the invitation to pay his respects to the Shah, as required by etiquette. In all these failings the Khan was found to be treacherous and hostile to the British Government, and it was determined, in order to establish security in this quarter, to exact retribution.

In November 1839, a force, under the command of General Willshire, was sent to depose the Khan, and the British force gallantly took Kelat, which was defended with much obstinacy. Mehrab died sword in hand, surrounded by his chiefs, many of whom perished with him. On the 6th October, 1841, the Government formally installed Mir Nazir to be Khan of Kelat. A short time after this settlement, the reverses of the British in Afghanistan obliged the Government to again make a movement by the Bolan and Quetta into Afghanistan, and Mir Nazir kept his engagements, and assisted in the operations. In 1843 the province of Sind was conquered and annexed. At the close of the war, the troops having been removed, the tribes found an opportunity to follow their habitual inclinations, and raids and inroads took place. In 1847 a new administration was created on the Sind frontier, with the view of repressing the aggressive acts of the Belooch tribes, and introducing order along our border; and Major Jacob, a very talented and energetic soldier, was appointed 'Political Superintendent and Commander of the Upper Sind Frontier.' For a number of years this officer pursued a line of vigorous action, punishing the raids of the tribes by attack in the plain with his cavalry detachments, which were posted along the border and ever on the alert. General Jacob originated measures which resulted, under a succession of able officers, in introducing peace, order, and respect for the British name, where hitherto there had been rapine, murder, and a state of constant alarm. A second treaty was effected in May 1854. The provisions of this treaty were, that Mir Nazir II. bound himself to oppose the enemies of the British, to act subordinate to the Government, and to enter into no negotiations with other states without consent. On the faithful performance of these several engagements, the Khan was to receive an annual subsidy of 50,000 Rs., which grant was to be withheld if the conditions were not acted up to. This treaty remained unfulfilled. The Khan neglected to enforce order; and as regards the stipulation for the prevention of the plundering of caravans, this remained a dead letter, and the Bolan was closed, and all traffic at an end.

In 1857 Mir Nazir died suddenly, and it is said he was poisoned by Gul Mahomed, an officer of his court, who hated the English.

In 1874–75 the reign of Khuddadad Khan was marked by anarchy and civil war, with scarce any intermissions, culminating in a state of affairs which became intolerable. Trade routes were closed, the treaty stipulations were set at nought, and the Khan himself was in danger of losing his throne, and even his life.

To avert an impending crisis, Major, now Sir Robert Sandeman, who had obtained an influence over the tribe, was deputed to the Mari and Brahni chiefs, and was well received by them, and subsequently by the Khan himself. Both the parties of the conflict were weary and exhausted by the conflict. The British officer was welcomed by Khan and Sirdars alike.

In 1876 it was determined that Major Sandeman should again visit the court of the Khan, invested with higher powers, and an authority supported by a military force. During the sojourn of the mission in the country, Kelat enjoyed a repose, and a commercial and agricultural prosperity, such as never had been before known. Trade was resumed, villages were rebuilt, and land that was lying fallow was brought under cultivation.

The succeeding step in the proceeding was the execution of a treaty based on the stipulations of former engagements, amplified to complete relations between the two Governments in a manner calculated to improve the interests of both; and as the troops of the British Government were already at Kelat, where their presence was heartily welcomed, it was wisely decided not to withdraw them. The final arrangement was the constitution of an agency, over which Sir Robert Sandeman should preside, and the location of the troops and agents at Quetta.

Thus a most important part of our frontier has been converted from a scene of disorder into a fairly peaceable country, and a base of operations was afforded which saved infinite hardships, and even loss and bloodshed, in the operations which became necessary in 1878.

CAMPAIGN OF 1878–79.

Towards the end of September 1878, the intercourse between the British Government and the Amir of Kabul, Shere Ali, became so strained, that the probability of an early recourse to arms was foreseen,

and a concentration of troops was made towards three points on the frontier, into Peshawur, the Kurrum, and to Quetta. The Quetta column was under the command of Major-General Sir Michael Biddulph, K.C.B., R.A. The several scenes of operations were so distinct, that no intercommunication could take place; and thus the several commanders were entirely independent of each other, and received instructions direct from the head-quarters of the army and of Government. The force under General Biddulph's command consisted of three regiments of cavalry, seven of infantry, one field and two mountain batteries, two companies of sappers and miners, field engineers and an ordnance park: about 6400 men and sixteen guns.

It was about the 23rd September when the corps began to move from Mooltan. The departure of the troops from Jacobabad was delayed by the unusually extensive floods of the Indus. The route taken from Mooltan was across two rivers, the Chenab and the Indus, to Dehra Ghazi Khan, forty-six miles; and although every facility was afforded by using steamers and flats in transporting the troops, crossing the rivers exposed the men and officers to a sun which had not yet lost much of its violent heat. Long, weary marches over tracts of desert and sterile, hot, low hills, had to be traversed to reach the foot of the Bolan Pass.

The orders for the march were carried into effect by the local military authorities. The principal features of the instructions were, the scale of camp equipage and baggage was set at the lowest possible allowance consistent with health and comfort, a month's provisions were to be sent with each corps, and commanders were warned that moving through the territory of a friendly chief — that of the Khan of Khelat — the people were to be treated with consideration; at the same time, all proper precautions were to be taken to guard against marauders.

General Biddulph, with his staff, left Mooltan on the 13th October by steamer, and on the third day reached Mithunkot, on the right bank of the Indus; and at Rajanpur, an important frontier station twelve miles distant, met the 70th Foot and E-4 Field Battery, who were halting there to complete their provision columns. Arrangements having been completed, the battery and regiment pursued their march to Bandowali, forty miles distant. The march of the battery of artillery from Lagoshi, sixteen miles, the latter part of it

through deep sand, caused much distress to bullocks and horses, and a halt was made to prepare for a march of twenty-three miles to the next camp, Kabrudani, the road lying for the most part over deep sand. There is no water on the way. The 70th Regiment having experienced all the depressing influences of a hot season at Multan, and being suddenly set on the march at a season and in a country subject to great sun-heat, suffered considerably from exposure, and special arrangements were made to ensure their comfort and safety.

The march commenced at 8 p.m., the battery and its escort leading the way. The progress was a successive movement; wagon after wagon stuck in the deep sand and had to be left behind; but after great exertions on the part of the men and officers, and water and food being sent back to the men left behind, the carriages were extricated during the next day. This march of twenty-three miles over desert sand having been overcome, the remainder of the march was accomplished without great difficulty. By the 9th November General Biddulph reached Quetta; and the arrival of additional troops brought a sense of relief to the officials at that station. On the 18th and 19th, the General, accompanied by Sir R. Sandeman, made a reconnaissance to Kujlak and the Afghan frontier. A depôt of provisions and wood was commenced at Kujlak. The 32nd Pioneers commenced to march, road-making as they moved. A garrison was left at Quetta, and General Biddulph and the head-quarters moved to Haiklezai, where there was a suitable open position, and where supplies were obtainable from the surrounding villages. At Haiklezai, the column halted until the 8th December. A fort was formed at the very foot of the Kojak Pass, and was named Kojak camp.

An examination of the Pass was now made by Colonels Hichens and Browne, R.E., and on the 12th the works were commenced. The tracks on the Kojak were only fit for footmen, mules, or donkeys, but for laden camels and wheeled artillery the Pass was found to be absolutely impracticable. It was therefore decided to improve the steep gorge to the top, and bring the old zigzag of 1839–42 into use. A good deal of wedging and blasting had to be done to bring the road to a sufficient width and equality of gradient for the passage of the guns. On the evening of the 14th, the Pass was reported fit for the passage of infantry

and cavalry and mountain guns; and on the 15th, Colonel Kennedy moved the advanced guard, consisting of the 2nd Panjab Cavalry, the 1st Panjab Native Infantry, and two mountain guns, to Chaman.

In consultation with Colonel Hichens, R.E., and Colonel Le Messurier, R.A., it was now decided to improve a tolerably straight gully into a ramp, and to let the guns down by rope. The ramp was at an angle of about 31 degrees, and five hundred feet long. At the top of the Pass platforms were provided for packing the carriages, and for the party working the ropes. On the 18th the slide was reported fit for the artillery, and on the next day the E Battery 4th Brigade, commenced to make the descent. The operation was performed by sending down a limber, a body, or a gun only at a time. The passing a battery over took about one and a half days, and, though laborious, was completely successful. In the midst of the operations of the Kojak, General Sir Donald Stewart arrived and assumed supreme command.

In order to decide on the possibility of making use of the Gwaja Pass, and adapting it to the passage of General Stewart's heavy artillery, a reconnaissance was sent, accompanied by the senior artillery and engineer officers, out through the Gwaja, round by the plains of the north side, and back over the Kojak, making a complete circuit. The result of this study of both Passes caused General Stewart to commence work on the Gwaja, and troops were sent to carry out the operation under the superintendence of Colonel Sankey, R.E.

Although the force had no enemy to contend with, the movement they were making was one of great interest; the overcoming the difficulties which arose in procuring supplies, the actual marching and care of baggage, and the mastering the physical difficulties of the country excited a healthy spirit of energy in all ranks.

On the 1st January, the 2nd Division Head Quarters moved to Chaman, and on the 3rd General Nuthall's column commenced the march. General Lacy was ordered to follow on the 4th. On the 5th January, Colonel Kennedy met the enemy's cavalry at the Glokotul. He drove them through the Pass, with some loss on their part, and retreating into the Takht-i-pul plain, the Afghan horse were met by a

squadron of the 15th Hussars, under Major Luck, who charged and dispersed them. On the line of advance of the other column there was also an engagement with the enemy, who withdrew with some loss and retreated on Kandahar.

On the march to the Turnak, information was received from General Sir Donald Stewart, who was in front, that Mir Assul had fled, and that the Kandahar troops had dispersed or followed him.

On the 8th, the force made a ceremonial march through the city. The whole force encamped in the open plain in one line, facing Ghazni, and enjoyed a short repose after their continued exertions.

From the 8th to the 14th, the 2nd Division was occupied in preparation for a movement to the Helmund.

On the 15th January, General Stewart, with the 1st Division, marched towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

On the 14th, General Palliser moved the cavalry to Kokeran, with orders to commence collecting supplies and to pave the way for the march of the main body.

On the 16th January, the head-quarters and the main body of the 2nd Division commenced the march to the Helmund and encamped at Kokeran.

On the 30th, an advanced guard under Colonel Kennedy encamped at Abazza, and was further augmented by the movement of Colonel Nicholletts with half a battalion of the 2nd Belooches.

On the 29th, General Biddulph made a reconnaissance in force, forded the Helmund, visited the castle, and returned to Bala Khan. General Biddulph's force maintained their position on the Helmund, till the 23rd of February, when orders were received for its recall. Colonel Malcolmson had orders to time his withdrawal so as to keep one march in rear of Palliser's column, acting as rear-guard. On the evening of the 26th, Malcolmson was attacked by 1500 Alizais, and others. The enemy had marched thirty miles during the day, along the foot of the hills, approaching the camp with caution. They were repulsed with the loss of 150 men. Major Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse, a gallant and talented officer, and a few sowars, were killed. General Biddulph reached Balozai on the 22nd March.

Major Keen's column, with Major Sandeman, were, at this date, several marches *en route*. Major

Keen reached the Smallan Valley, at Baghao, on the 6th of March, where he was suddenly and vigorously attacked by the combined tribal force of Thob, Bori, and the vicinity. Major Keen's dispositions were well made, and the troops behaved with great gallantry. The enemy was beaten off with considerable loss. Keen's loss was slight.

The movement to India, from Legari Barkhan, commenced on the 11th April. The passage of the rivers occasioned a good deal of exposure. On the 27th the force reached the Chenab.

The 1st Division Peshawur Valley Field Force, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Samuel Browne, K.C.S.I., V.C., assembled at Peshawur at the latter end of October, 1878, and was composed of four brigades.

The force marched from Peshawur about the middle of November, and on the morning of the 21st November paraded at Jumrood for the attack on the Khyber. The strong fort of Ali Musjid was captured on the same day.

The position was strongly held by the enemy, who were completely defeated after several hours' fighting, and retreated with the loss of their guns and stores. Two brigades made a detour, and did not rejoin until after the fall of the fort.

On the morning of the 22nd November, the fort was taken possession of; a few of the enemy, who were still lurking about, were driven off, and also some Afridi depredators who were beginning to plunder. During the advance through the Khyber, four Companies of Sappers were employed in making the road passable for guns, and in dragging them up.

After the fall of Ali Musjid, the force advanced to Lundi Kotul, and thence to Dakka. Dakka Fort was thoroughly repaired,—the work consisting of re-roofing sheds, rebuilding walls, filling up holes in the interior of the place, and constructing outposts for picquets. Two boats, of six and fifteen tons respectively, were constructed at Dakka Fort, for ferrying purposes across the Kabul river.

On arrival at Jalalabad, on the 20th December, 1878, the first works undertaken were road-making and drainage works in camp. As it appeared likely that the Division would remain at Jalalabad for some time, wood was collected for the different works likely to be required; a large quantity of fir and cypress spars was found cut in the Amir's garden, most of which was utilised. Several defensible forts were made; one at the Kabul, or west gate; one at Piper's Hill, for a picquet; one on a hill, to the south of the camp, for a picquet; also one at Ali Boghan, seven miles off, for a detachment of army signallers with a guard.

About the middle of February, it was considered advisable to improve the communications with the Peshawur Valley. The road from Lundi Kotul to Jalalabad was widened and improved, and the construction of the road was taken up systematically. The 2nd Division, moving up, took the part to Lundi Kotul; thence, onward, was done by the 1st Division. Lieut.-Colonel Blair, R.E., was detailed to the general charge on the 7th January. Heavy work was required at the Lundi Kotul incline; sappers, pioneer workmen, and extensive gangs of country labourers were employed upon it, until it finally became a fine road. Two large sheds for commissariat stores, each 140 feet long, were constructed at Jalalabad, each shed capable of containing 3200 tons of flour. An extensive fortified port, designated Fort Sale, was constructed round these sheds, with defensible barracks at the bastions, calculated to contain 500 men. This work was commenced on the 20th February.

On arrival at Jalalabad, it was found that the Kabul river was fordable in only a few places, and it was thought necessary to construct a bridge to last until the melting snows of the hills should swell the river. Accordingly bridges in three lengths of 170 feet, 170 feet, and 232 feet, were constructed; the trusses used were made up in the Attock workshops, on the model of the trusses used for the Attock bridge of boats, modified for transport. Besides being eminently useful for transport of supplies, it was used to pass across detachments of the force on several expeditions. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir F. Paul Haines, accompanied by the Chief of the Staff, Major-General Sir Peter Lumsden, visited Jalalabad in February.

For various reasons it was considered advisable to run a new road from Ali Boghan (seven miles from Jalalabad) along the river-bank instead of inland. A company of Sappers was sent to commence it on the 17th January, and the head-quarters and all available Sappers on the 26th January, not returning until the 20th March; during this extensive work was accomplished, a good road being cut for about eight miles. Gun-cotton was largely used in this work.

The military field-telegraph operations were of great interest and importance to the public service. About five thousand messages were passed over the military line in about nine weeks. A line was put up from Jalalabad to near Dakka, about forty miles, meeting the civil line there, and worked for six weeks. When the civil line was moved up, the military was reeled up and waited for the advance, when it was constructed to about the same distance, thirty-five miles, from Jalalabad to Safed Sung, working for about a fortnight, the civil line again moving up, and the military reeling up and preparing for a new advance.

The head-quarters of the division marched from Jalalabad on the 12th April, arriving at Safed Sung on the 15th. General Charles Gough's brigade moved towards Safed Sung on the 1st April. On the 2nd April the brigade found a strong force of the enemy occupying a position at Futtehabad. General Gough at once attacked and routed the enemy with considerable loss, the cavalry pursuing and cutting up many fugitives. Major Battye, a most gallant and enterprising officer, was killed on this occasion. Two fortified posts were constructed between Jalalabad and Safed Sung, one at Rozabad, and one at Fort Battye, near the spot where the action was fought. The stay of the force at Safed Sung was so undetermined that extensive works for shelter were not taken up. Some material was collected and sufficient shelter constructed, however. The hospital shelter was very convenient. A trestle-bridge was constructed over the Murkhi Kheyl river at Safed Sung, between the 6th and the 16th May. All those important engineering works were constructed under the orders of Major-General Maunsell, C.B., the commanding Royal Engineers, and reflect the greatest credit on that officer and the officers and men employed under his orders. The treaty of peace was signed at Gundamuk on the 26th May, 1879. The Amir, Yakoob Khan, was received by Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, the

troops in camp being drawn up to receive the Amir. Soon afterwards orders were received for the forces to return to India. The engineering works on the evacuation were confined to rafting operations from Jalalabad to Dakka.

This important operation was conducted with complete success under the orders of Major-General Maunsell, C.B., R.E. One hundred and eighty-four skin-rafts, of from fifty to sixty skins in each, were used. Total skins between seven and eight thousand, beside five rafts of casks, pontoons, &c. The stores conveyed were Engineer, Ordnance, Medical ambulances, civil and military telegraph, commissariat food and dead stock, camp equipage, &c. 885 officers and soldiers, including 339 sick, were also rafted.

The following list includes most of the various expeditions detailed from the Peshawur Valley :—

On the 9th December, 1878, from Dakka to Zukka Kheyl, under Brigadier-General Tytler.

On the 19th December, 1878, from Jumrood to Bazar Valley, under Lieutenant-General Maude.

On the 27th January, 1879, from Dakka to Bazar Valley, under Brigadier-General Tytler.

On the 27th January, 1879, from Jumrood to Bazar Valley, under Lieutenant-General Maud.

On the 7th February, 1879, an expedition from Jalalabad, under Brigadier-General Macpherson.

On the 19th March, 1879, from Girdi Kas to Barikab, under Brigadier-General Tytler.

On the 31st March, 1879, from Jalalabad to Lughman.

On the 1st April, 1879, from Jalalabad to Futtehabad, under Brigadier-General Charles Gough.

The force ordered to assemble in the Kurrum Valley in October, 1878, under the command of Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts, consisted of the following troops :—

ARTILLERY. COLONEL LINDSAY COMMANDING.

F, A, R.H.A. ; G, 3, R.A. ; Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries, P.F.F., and Ordnance Field Park.

Engineers.—Colonel Perkins, R.E., Commanding.

CAVALRY. COLONEL HUGH GOUGH, C.B., V.C., COMMANDING.

One squadron, 10th Hussars; 12th Bengal Cavalry.

1st Infantry Brigade, Colonel Cobbe, 17th Foot, Commanding.—2nd Battalion 8th Foot; 29th B.N.I.; 5th Panjab Infantry.

2nd Infantry Brigade, Colonel Thelwall, C.B., Commanding.—72nd Highlanders; 21st N.I.; 2nd P.I.; 5th Goorkha Regiment.

The following troops were detailed to join the Kurrum force after the commencement of hostilities :—

C Battery, 4th Brigade; a squadron 9th Lancers; 1st Bengal Cavalry; 14th Bengal Lancers. Infantry, 67th Regiment, 92nd Highlanders, 2nd Q. O. L. I., 11th N. I.

The strength of the Kurrum field force rose gradually from 4741 men of all ranks on the 1st November, 1878, to 13,269, inclusive of the Panjab Chiefs' contingent.

The Kurrum Valley may be divided into three parts. The first, or river part, from Thull to the head of the river, at Budesh Kheyl; the second from Budesh Kheyl to Keraiah, and the third from Keraiah to its source in the Shuturgurdan range. The elevation of Alikheyl is about 6800 feet.

At 10 o'clock on the night of December 2nd, the troops who had been warned for the attack of the position held by the Afghans at Peiwar Kotul, formed up in the dark as quietly as possible. To arrive at the Springawi Nullah the Peiwar village had to be reached, a distance of about three and a quarter miles of broken ground. The 29th P. N. I. and the 5th Goorkhas led the column, then the Mountain Battery, followed by the 72nd Highlanders, the 2nd P. I. and the 23rd Pioneers escorting four guns of the Horse Artillery on elephants.

The capture of the Peiwar Kotul is fully described in an admirable work by Major Colquhoun, R.A.—*With the Kurrum Field Force in* 1878-79, and it would be impossible in a brief sketch to give a detailed account of this most brilliant exploit. In the battle of the Peiwar the Afghans had great advantages. Our long-range artillery could have but little effect upon their position; while our rifles, in the close fighting that followed were

but slightly superior to the Enfield rifles opposed to them. They also had the knowledge of the ground, in which we were deficient, and they were defending their own country, and had ample provisions and ammunition.

But with all these advantages they could not stand against the onset of our troops at the Springawi, and they gave up the key of their position, from whence we could operate on their flanks and rear. The number of the Afghans opposed to us on this occasion could not be well estimated. Besides the regular troops, who were estimated at eight regiments, or about 4800 men, there were the natives of Hariab, and a swarm of fighting men of the neighbouring tribes.

Eleven mountain guns were captured with their carriages. The brass ordnance captured were of excellent make and well provided in every respect. Our loss at the Peiwar Kotul was 2 officers and 18 men killed, and 3 officers, 75 men wounded. The Afghans had sufficient men to hold about a mile and a half of ground, not counting the men detached at the Springawi Kotul, and their loss must have been proportionately heavy.

On the 22nd March, His Excellency Sir Frederick Paul Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., reached Kurrum, accompanied with the head-quarter staff, consisting of Major-General Lumsden, C.B., C.S.I., Adjutant-General; Colonel Gordon, C.S.I., D.A.G.; Colonel Preston, Military Secretary; Major-General Johnson, C.B., Quarter-Master General; Colonel Macgregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., A.Q.M.G.; Surgeon-General Ker Innes, C.B.; Dr. Bradshaw.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief inspected the force, and after the usual parade movements, officers were called to the front, and the Commander-in-Chief, addressing General Roberts, complimented him on the appearance of the troops, and expressed his satisfaction at meeting them in sight of the Peiwar Kotul, where their gallant action was fought. The Commander-in-Chief alluded to the remarkably good conduct of the Kurrum Field Force,—not an instance of any complaint as regards the behaviour of the men having been brought to his notice. At the same time he said that the other columns of the Kabul Force had behaved equally well, nor in any way was their conduct below that of the Kurrum troops.

On the 26th May, a telegram was received by the General that the treaty of peace of Gundamuk had been signed, and on the following day the head-quarters marched to Kurrum with Brigadier-General Watson.

The following valedictory order was issued by the Major-General Commanding, on the departure of the Panjab Chiefs' Contingent :—

'June 2nd, 1879. The Panjab Chiefs' Contingent having been ordered to return to India, Major-General Roberts desires to record his high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-General Watson, C.B., V.C., and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under his command. The Contingent troops have formed part of the Kurrum Field Force for more than three months, and during that time have been constantly engaged in escorting convoys and protecting the lines of communication. These arduous duties have been carried out to the Major-General's entire satisfaction, and the loyalty and alacrity evinced in their performance have been equalled by the excellent behaviour of the men, both in camp and on the line of march. Their conduct since joining the force has not been the subject of a single complaint by the inhabitants of the country, and their steadiness and good discipline reflects honour on the chiefs whom they serve.'

Sir Louis Cavagnari, who was appointed as Envoy and Resident at Kabul, on the declaration of peace, started on his ill-fated mission from Kurrum to Kabul almost before the new Amir, Yakoob Khan, was seated on his throne. In the month of August, 1879, the Afghans rose *en masse* and attacked the Residency with artillery and infantry. After an heroic defence, lasting for several hours, the gallant Envoy, with all the officers who had accompanied him, and the men of his escort, were overpowered by numbers and killed. Only two or three men of the Guides escaped to tell the tale of the massacre.

Under cover of darkness, early on the morning of the 14th October, 1879, the enemy crept up and lodged in masses close to the defences at Ali Kheyl. The attack was easily repulsed. Some of the hill men, armed only with knives, were bayonetted by the 29th Native Infantry outside the stockade. Afterwards General Gordon took the offensive, handling the troops with great skill and inflicting considerable loss on the enemy.

CAMPAIGN OF 1879–80.

On the news of the massacre of the Envoy at Kabul reaching India, Sir Frederick Roberts, who was at the time at Simla, immediately started again for the front. Reaching Ali Kheyl in a few days; by great exertion on the part of all the officers and men of the force, who were animated by the example of their chief, the force was ready to advance, from Ali Kheyl towards Kabul, in the beginning of October. The force reached Charasiab on the 6th October, and found the Afghans occupying a position on the heights and ready to oppose them. Beyond the camping-ground is a district abounding in cultivated enclosures and walled gardens. An active enemy would have lined the edges with skirmishers, and posted his squadrons behind the villages. But the Afghans had no cavalry, and the infantry had a dread of being caught in the open. As usual, they had posted themselves along the crests of the hills. Their position, roughly speaking, resembling a horseshoe. The left segment was formed by a lofty range of hills, ending in a precipitous conical-shaped peak, directly beneath which road and river run side by side through a narrow gap. A lower range, with gradually falling, rounded slopes, completed the right segment.

General Baker's brigade (composed of the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, and the 5th Panjab Infantry, and a mule battery) succeeded in rolling up the enemy's right and working steadily, up and down hill, towards the Pass. The ground was bare and destitute of cover: at one point our losses were heavy, and a slight check occurred.

Meantime, G Battery, 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery, with a small escort of cavalry and infantry, went straight up against the Pass, where the enemy's guns were posted. Barring the passage were two steep, isolated hills, one below the other, covered with stone breastworks.

Some time after G Battery, 3rd Brigade, opened fire, Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, brought a company close under the first hill, and then made a rush against the enemy above. It is said to have been a fine sight to see the Highlanders straining doggedly on without firing a single shot. Now and

then the Afghans swarmed out in front of their defences, but the artillery fire was always sufficient to turn them flying under cover again. About half-way up, the little storming party found shelter behind some rocks, when they collected for the last rush with the bayonet that made the hill their own. After this exploit, Major White, reinforced by some men of his own regiment, and some of the 23rd Pioneers, cleared the second hill, and then made for the centre of the enemy's position, where he took the guns. As soon as it was seen that the enemy were in retreat, the 5th Panjab Cavalry and a squadron of the 9th Lancers rode into the Pass. The ground here is very much enclosed and intersected by broad ditches, and the road and river find their way together through the narrow pass. The troopers were obliged to dismount, but made good use of their carbines.

Before evening, the tribes who had occupied the heights on the right of the camp were driven off, and during the night both the Pass and the camp were held by our troops.

After their defeat at Charasiab, the Afghans offered comparatively little opposition to the advance. Sir Frederick Roberts advanced and captured the city of Kabul; the magazines, with sixty guns; the Bala Hissar, and the Sherpur Cantonment. In November a force was despatched from Kabul, under Brigadier-General Macpherson, to join hands with the Khyber Field Force that had advanced through the Khyber to Jalalabad and Gundamuk, under the command of Lieut.-General Bright. The two commanders met near Kota Sungh, on the 6th November. General Macpherson's column returning to Kabul, and General Gough's brigade returning to Gundamuk. Detachments were left at the various posts between Gundamuk and Kabul, viz. Soorkhab, Jugdulluk Kotul, Jugdulluk, and Latabund.

On Monday, 8th December, 1879, General Roberts ordered a great divisional parade at Kabul. On the afternoon after the review (the village of Arghandi, a great centre of discontent, on the direct road to Ghazni having been selected for attack), Macpherson's brigade moved into the Chardeh valley, and encamped at Killa. On the 9th the forces halted, to allow General Baker to develope his turning movement by the Logar valley, and across the hills by Maidan. Warnings had not been wanting. The deportation of Yakoob

Khan and the various tentative means for securing tranquillity, excited nothing but enmity and distrust among the tribes.

A large contingent from Kohistan was reported to be creeping round from the north to join the gathering at Arghandi. General Macpherson, by a skilful manœuvre, placed his brigade in the hollow of a commanding ridge, before the Kohistanis or the Arghandi columns were aware of its presence. On the guns opening fire, the hostile masses dispersed, and the infantry, Sikhs on the right, English in the centre, and Goorkhas on the left, raced down the slopes towards the enemy. The affair lasted little more than an hour. The enemy's loss was between fifty and a hundred.

On the 11th December, 1879, Brigadier-General Massey, with four H. A. guns, and four squadrons of cavalry, rode out from the camp at Killa. This was part of the original plan of General Roberts for surrounding and crushing the enemy at Arghandi. General Macpherson was to push straight along by the Pughman hills, while General Baker was to take the enemy in rear from Maidan. The Killa Kasi, 2000 yards off, made a good target for the first shells, but as village and enclosures were rapidly left behind, the battery became hotly engaged. Round after round of shrapnel was hurled forward, but the enemy had taken the measure of the little force, and swept down with great determination.

Then it was that the want of a few hundred good rifles was sorely felt. After thirty dismounted horsemen had in vain striven to make up for the deficiency, it became evident that a desperate effort must be made to save the honour of the day. Side by side the British and Indian Lancers dashed forward on their hopeless errand. The ground was unfitted for cavalry, and the enemy's loose formation offered no resistance to the shock. Of all the officers of the 9th Lancers who took part in that charge, but three escaped unscathed. Hearsey and Ricardo of the 9th, and Forbes of the 14th, were killed, and the colonel of the 9th was terribly wounded.*

Retreat was still possible, but before a practicable roadway in the required direction was hit upon, the

* Lieut.-Colonel Cleland, 9th Lancers, died of his wounds some months afterwards.

leading gun toppled over into a deep ditch, hopelessly blocking the passage for those that followed. Groups of troopers made charge after charge without checking the enemy's masses. At last, when the case was desperate, orders were given to the gunners to cut the traces, and gallop off, thus avoiding the sacrifice of many valuable lines.

General Macpherson's infantry was pushing forwards so rapidly that with another hour's grace the guns would have been saved, and the brigade actually got within distant view of the field before the fighting was over. General Macpherson chased the enemy on the right up the hills for some miles. While General Macpherson was thus employed, the lost guns were recovered. The carriages had been stripped and left lying by the enemy in their haste when captured; and Colonel Macgregor, with a very small party of officers and men, collected as he went, was able to sally out and bring them back. At midnight the Guides cavalry and infantry marched in from Seh Baba, having covered that day over thirty miles, or three marches, the first of which, over the Lataband Pass, was by far the worst on the line.

None now knew better than General Roberts the arduous task that was before him, and that to re-establish our shaken prestige many valuable lives must be sacrificed, and many desperate deeds attempted.

On the morning of the 12th December, the enemy's flag waved from the lofty Takht-i-Shah, and from a lower and more advanced peak, but the Sher Durwaza, and the command of the city, were in the hands of the 72nd. Part of Macpherson's brigade moving up early from Siah Sung, the attack began along the ridge. The base of the Takht-i-Shah was reached by the afternoon, but a murderous fire from the sides checked all further advance.

About eight in the morning of the 13th, General Baker marched out past the city with a strong brigade. He sent the 92nd Highlanders straight at the heights above Beri Hissar, telling them this was the post of honour. The gallant regiment sprang forward and carried crest after crest at the point of the bayonet. A severe fight ensued. The rabble, too, from the city commenced sharp-shooting from the Bala Hissar and from the walled villages in the plain. But the fire from all these quarters was steadily quelled,

and finally the Guides cavalry swept across the valley, while the 9th Lancers and the 5th Panjab Cavalry rode along the ridge itself. The enemy stood up boldly to meet them with their rifles, but the Guides charging to the cry of 'Bala Hissar!' had not forgotten the massacre of September, and the enemy suffered severely.

On the 14th there was again severe fighting, with heavy loss on both sides, and General Roberts wisely decided upon instant concentration within the Sherpur defences. The enemy failed to press their advantage, and General Macpherson's brigade reached Sherpur without serious mishap.

General Roberts now took up a defensive position, and he chose Sherpur rather than Siah Sung, or the Bala Hissar, in virtue of a decision arrived at two months before, and not under pressure of immediate necessity. The wisdom of the change of tactics after the events of the 14th was apparent to all. Reinforcements might be reasonably expected to arrive in a week. There had been no direct defeat, but five days' marching, and climbing, and fighting, fasting and watching, is a severe ordeal for any troops.

From Deh Afghan, right round to Behmaru villages and walled gardens, had been left standing at a convenient distance from Sherpur. These were now occupied by the enemy. The position of the little garrison that held the Lataband Pass caused great anxiety. Communication could only be held by the heliograph, and at this time the sun was much obscured by clouds.

At last the tiny intermittent flash from Lataband reached Kabul, and gave the welcome message that the post was safe, and the advancing brigade under General Charles Gough was expected on the 22nd.

To supply the deficiency of cavalry with General Gough's brigade, and also to secure, if possible, the bridge over the Logar, the 12th Bengal Cavalry were ordered to make their way through the enemy's position and to join hands with General Charles Gough. This exploit was carried out in the most gallant and spirited manner. The bridge at the Logar was found intact and unoccupied; but at Butkhak a regiment of Afghan regulars turned out and received the brave sowars with volleys of musketry, so they rode on ten miles further to Lataband without drawing rein.

The hours of Mahomed Jan's greatness were now numbered.

On the 23rd December, an hour before daybreak, a clear beacon-fire shone out from the Asmai Hill. Every man in Sherpur was at once at his post, for this was the signal for the long-threatened attack.

The enemy collected in thousands under Bimaru, and were rapidly increasing in numbers, running in groups of ten and twelve from one village to another.

About this time Brigadier-General Hugh Gough was struck by a spent bullet. When the direction of the main attack became evident, General Roberts was at liberty to concentrate reserves in sufficient force to roll back the most determined assault. On the other side the attack hung fire all day, never getting past the stage of a demonstration. When the first wave of the attack on Behmaru seemed spent, and before another could gather force, General Roberts sent four guns, well escorted, through the gorge in the centre of the ridge, with orders to wheel to the right and take the enemy in flank. The moment was perfectly judged. No sooner did the Afghans perceive the cavalry and guns on their flank, than they began to retire from the nearest villages, and this retreat soon became a rout. The main body made for the Pai Manar Kotul, while on either side a multitude of stragglers dotted the snow-covered fields.

The mass of the fugitives escaped unscathed, but a number of stragglers were cut up by the 5th Panjab Cavalry, and others streaming back were raked by a searching fire by the 67th from the cantonment walls.

In the afternoon, the two Infantry Brigadiers, moving out to the east of Sherpur, blew up the towers of some of the villages that lay in the path of General Gough's advance. In performing this service the lives of Captain Dundas, V.C., and Lieutenant Nugent, two most distinguished officers of the Royal Engineers, were sacrificed to a defective fuse, a mine which they had prepared exploding before they could get clear.

The enemy, though they made a last demonstration on Siah Sung, fell back that night upon the city, disheartened and ripe for flight. Next morning there was not an armed man to be seen, and the cavalry had a twenty-mile ride, in vain pursuit, without firing a shot.

Thus ended the great jehad of Mahomed Jan and the Moolah, Mushk-i-Alam. On the 24th, General Charles Gough, with his brigade, marched into Sherpur.

The force that advanced through the Khyber and from Lundi Kotul after the massacre of the Envoy, was under the command of Lieutenant-General Bright. It was divided into three brigades, the first under Brigadier-General Charles Gough, the second under Brigadier-General Arbuthnot, and the third under Brigadier-General Doran. Although a large part of the Khyber Field Force was not so frequently engaged with the enemy in the early portion of the second phase of the Afghan campaign, the duties performed by this force were none the less arduous and important. The line of communication from Lundi Kotul to Kabul was continually attacked and harassed by the Ghilzais, Hazarehs, and other tribes. Telegraph wires were cut, posts attacked, stragglers murdered; and it was only by incessant care and watchfulness on the part of the commanders, and the steadiness and excellent behaviour of the troops under their command, that the convoys to and from Kabul were enabled to move. Defensive posts had to be constructed and garrisoned, and the supplies of food for men and cattle, and ammunition, were entirely dependent upon the keeping up of this line of communication. General Charles Gough's brigade were encamped for a month at Gundamuk, and a lengthened stay being anticipated, arrangements were made for hutting the troops. A large fort and other works were also commenced.

These engineering works were ably executed under the orders of the commanding engineer, Colonel Limond, R.E. The operations carried out by the Khyber Field Force, under General Bright, and by the 1st brigade, under General Charles Gough, on his advance through the passes, were of so extensive, varied, and arduous a nature, that it is only possible in a sketch like this to allude to them.

General Gough marched from Gundamuk on the 14th December, 1880, with the following troops:—10th Bengal Lancers, 130 men; No. 5 Company, Sappers, 73 men; 2nd Battalion 9th Foot, 487 men; 4th Goorkhas, 375 men. The outpost at Pezwan, near the Soorkhal river, was held by 157 men of the 2nd Goorkhas; 6th Company, Sappers; 4 guns, Hazara Mountain Battery; 50 men of the 10th Bengal Lancers. At Jugdulluk Kotul there were the 2nd and 3rd Company, Sappers, and 40 men of the 2nd Goorkhas. Jugdulluk Fort was held by 180 men of the 2nd Goorkhas, 2 guns, Hazara Mountain Battery, and 90 men of the 10th

Bengal Lancers. On General Gough's arrival at Jugdulluk the whole country seemed to have risen in arms to bar his further progress, and daily skirmishes took place between the troops escorting the convoys between Pezwan and Jugdulluk. The post at Jugdulluk Kotul was attacked on three occasions, the last being on the 23rd December. On all these attacks the enemy were driven off. On the 21st December, after seven days' severe fighting in the passes, a large convoy bringing supplies and ammunition having arrived, General Charles Gough was in a position to advance towards Kabul. The road was covered with snow; but all difficulties were overcome. The force reached Latabund without opposition, relieving the garrison at that place, and on the 24th December General Gough's force reached Kabul and marched into Sherpur.

CAMPAIGN OF 1880.

In the spring of 1880, when the snow had disappeared from the roads and plains between Kandahar and Ghazni, an advance was made on the latter place from Kandahar.

The Ghazni Field Force was under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B., and consisted of the following troops:—

1st Infantry Brigade.—Brigadier-General Barter commanding. 60th Rifles, 15th Sikhs, 25th Panjab, N.I.

2nd Infantry Brigade. — Brigadier-General Hughes commanding. 59th Regiment, 3rd Goorkhas, 2nd Sikhs.

Cavalry Brigade. — Brigadier-General Palliser commanding. 1st Panjab Cavalry, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, 19th Bengal Lancers, 19th Panjab N.I. (with Head-quarters.)

Artillery.—Colonel Johnson, R.H.A. commanding. A Battery, R.H.A.; G Battery, 4th Brigade, R.A., 6th Battery, 11 Brigade, R.A.; Heavy Battery; 11th Battery, 11th Brigade, R.A.; Mountain Battery; Nos. 4 and 10 Company Sappers and Miners.

Engineer Field Park, Ordnance, Transport, Survey, and Commissariat Departments.

Total number of fighting men, in round numbers, 7000.

The 1st Brigade left Kandahar on the 29th March, moving by the left bank of the Tarnak. General Stewart, with the Head-quarters, left Kandahar on the 30th March. On the 6th and 7th April, the Head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade, respectively, reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and were joined by two companies, 59th Regiment, two guns G Battery, 4th Brigade R.A., and two guns 11th Battery, 11th Brigade, Mountain Battery, these troops having been on detachment there during the winter. A halt of two days was made and some additional supplies and transport animals taken on. The season and weather were favourable, and the loss in transport animals small. On the 8th and 9th April the march was continued from Kelat-i-Ghilzai.

The halting-places on the right bank were nearly the same as those encamped at by Keane's force, in 1838. They are as follows:—From Kandahar to Momand; Robat, Khel-i-Akhund, Shahr-i-Safr, Tirandaz, Jaldak, Pul-i-Sung, Kelat-i-Ghilzai, Sir-i-Asp, Naorat, Tazi, Shah Jui, Chashma-i-Panjak, Ghojan, Mukar, Kazez-i-Oba, Jamrud, Mashaki, Ahmed Khel; Nani to Ghazni (two marches). Total distance about 230 miles. These were the halting-places of the Head-quarters and 2nd Brigade.

The 1st Brigade followed a parallel line on the other side of the river until reaching Jamrud, where the whole Division concentrated, and afterwards moved on together.

The foraging parties were fired at once or twice, and on the 16th April, large bodies of the enemy were seen on the right. For some days the dust had been seen of a large body of troops moving about fifteen miles off on the right, and parallel to the line of march, and it was well known that the enemy had been marching up from near Kandahar, increasing their strength on the way, with the object of opposing the advance when a convenient time and place should be found. On the 17th April the whole Division concentrated at Jamrud.

On the 18th the force marched to Mashaki, by a sandy road, broken by nullahs and water-courses. Many burning villages were seen, which had been set on fire by the Hararas. In the afternoon, a recon-

noitring party was fired at, and reported the enemy in full force about three miles in front, in the direction of the next day's intended march.

The morning of the 19th April was close and sultry. The force marched at dawn, the line of march being over a broad plain, rough and stony, and crossed, at about three miles beyond Mashaki, by a line of low, sandy hills, where the Afghans had been seen the evening before. On advancing about six miles further, near the spot where it was intended to encamp, the crests of another and higher range of hills in our front and to the left of our road, were seen to be covered with a large Afghan force of horse and foot. Standards, red, green, and white, were being carried about, others were planted in the ground, Some saw the mullahs, or priests, blessing the weapons of the Ghazis before sending them down to fight.

Two batteries (A Battery, R.H.A., and G Battery, 4th Brigade R.A.) of artillery were soon in position; the former on a hillock to the left of the road; the latter on rather lower ground to the left, and rather in front of A Battery. A steady and effective fire was immediately opened on the main gathering of the enemy; the first shot was fired at 9 a.m. The infantry now came up and formed for attack on the left of the batteries,—59th on the left of G Battery, 4th Brigade, continued to the left by the 2nd Sikhs, then the 3rd Goorkhas, 19th Panjab N.I. in reserve. A gap was left between G Battery, 4th Brigade, and the right of the infantry line; this was filled by one company of 60th Rifles, and one company 25th Panjab N.I., both part of the Lieutenant-General's escort. Two squadrons, 2nd Panjab Cavalry, were on the right rear of A Battery, R.H.A. and of the other squadron; one troop, as escort, was on the right flank, and one on the left of the two batteries. The main body of the 19th Bengal Lancers formed up in front of the rear of the left of the infantry line. Two troops had been sent forwards to reconnoitre the enemy's right. 6th Battery, 11th Brigade, Heavy Battery, halted about 1000 yards in rear of the line and opposite the enemy's right. The field hospital was established in rear of the left; more to the centre was a hill, where the Lieutenant-General and Head-quarter Staff took post. The baggage was halted in the rear.

Such was the position when the battle of Ahmud Kheyl was begun. The Afghans were in a well-

chosen position and should have remained in it; but almost before the infantry line was formed, they began to come down upon the English force from all sides. In the centre crowds of Ghazis, on foot, came swarming over the crest and down the side of the high hill opposite the infantry and artillery; the latter continued firing, and the infantry now opened fire all along the line, but the Ghazis still came on. As they came on, at about 600 yards, the effect of the fire began to be seen in earnest, and at 300 and 400 yards the slaughter was terrific. As the smoke rolled away the ground in front was seen to be strewed with prostrate Ghazis. Still they advanced with courage amounting to madness. Now supports and reserves were all in the fighting line, and the artillery began to fire case and inverted shrapnel. While this was going on in the centre, the enemy on the right and left had also advanced. On the right, they came in masses of cavalry and infantry, making the most determined attempts to get round to the rear; it was here that the 2nd Panjab Cavalry did good service by making repeated charges by troops, thus checking the advance; but they came in such numbers that it was impossible to drive them all back at once. On the left, a similar turning movement was being attempted; here a party of the 19th Bengal Lancers, moving at a trot, came upon a large body of Ghazi cavalry galloping round the spur of a hill. It thus happened that the Lancers and the Ghazi cavalry, both parties fighting hand to hand, came galloping in past the left of and through the Goorkhas, who formed company and rallying squares. But the Ghazis, already without order or cohesion, were by the Lancers, the fire of the Goorkhas, the 19th Panjab, N.I., and of other corps near, who could bring any fire to bear upon them, dispersed and driven beyond our line. These three attacks were made almost simultaneously: that on the left began a little later than the others. A party of the enemy, also some cavalry, and some on foot, had made a move lower down the hill on our left rear, and opposite to where 6 Battery, 11 Brigade R.A. had halted. They appeared to be meditating an attack on the baggage, but a few shells from the 40-pounders being dropped among them, they were seen no more.

And now came the turning-point of the day. For three quarters of an hour the Ghazis had been

continually swarming on right up to the muzzles of the guns and rifles. As soon as a knot of six or seven had been swept away by case shot, as frequently happened, or mown down by the fire of the Henry-Martinis, their places were at once filled by others; their numbers seemed endless, and on the right considerable bodies were actually inside the English line. It became necessary to throw back that flank. The two batteries, the two escort companies (of 60th Rifles and 25th Panjab N.I.), and the 59th regiment, all retired (for about 200 yards on the extreme right towards the centre somewhat less). Again the guns came into action; the infantry halted, fronted, and again opened fire nearly in the original direction. The line at this time was in shape nearly the arc of a circle. After a few minutes more firing, it was plain that the rush of the Ghazis was broken. Crowds continued to come on, but not with the same vigour as before; then many were seen edging off to the right and left, some deliberately retreating. The entire attack seemed to open out and gain way, and a few minutes later the whole were in full retreat. The greater part of the cavalry, joined by the 1st Panjab Cavalry, which had come up in time from the 1st Brigade, pursued the fugitives for three miles, killing many. The numbers of the enemy were estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000; but many of these never came down from the hills. The real attack, the rush of the Ghazis, was made by 3000 or 4000, of whom about 600 were mounted. Their loss must have been about 2000 killed and wounded. Our numbers actually fighting were approximately 1800 infantry, 700 cavalry (not including the 1st Panjab Cavalry, which joined afterwards), 12 horse artillery and field guns, and the heavy battery, consisting of two 40-pounders, and two 6-3 in. howitzers. Our loss was 17 killed, 126 wounded. Most of the Afghans were armed with swords and shields, and some had Snider rifles and matchlocks.

The Afghan commanders were Shir Jan, Taraki, and Mahomed Aslam Khan, Tokhi. It is said that a son of Mushki Alam was present at the action. The chief tribes concerned in it were Tarakhis, Tokhis, and Suleiman Khels. The advance was continued to Nani, a village about seven miles beyond Ahmed Kheyl, where the force encamped. The following morning the force marched towards Ghazni. A strong party of cavalry were sent on, and found the place undefended. On the 21st the force reached Ghazni,

and encamped there. A large quantity of powder was found there, also a battery of six small brass guns, made at Sherpur, and four guns of higher calibre.

On the 22nd it was reported that a large body of the enemy were gathered in the villages of Urza and Shalez, seven miles south-west of Ghazni. They were attacked on the 23rd by the 1st Brigade, with large reinforcements from other brigades, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General Palliser. The advance was over stony and uneven ground, and a ridge of hills immediately in front hid the villages from view, until within two miles of them. The guns were at once pushed forward, and shelled the villages and positions occupied by the enemy, but the outer walls and those of the houses were so thick that the shells had but little effect.

As storming the position, although certain of success, would have cost many lives, a message was sent back to the Lieutenant-General, and the 3rd Goorkhas and a half battalion 59th were sent forward as a reinforcement. These were soon afterwards followed by the Lieutenant-General and the whole of the troops in reserve. Twice the enemy formed up and made a feint to advance, but were careful not to commit themselves to any rash action, and behaved very differently to the Ghazis at Ahmed Kheyl. At 11 a.m., an advance was made by a long line formed by the combined brigades. The artillery commenced shelling the villages and the party opposite the interval; the latter retiring slowly as soon as our advance began. The infantry opened fire as soon as they got within range. Steadily advancing, our long line reached the walls of the village, our flanks overlapped and began to turn them; then, fearful of being surrounded and caught in a trap, all the Afghans rushed out and made off over the country in full retreat. The enemy's loss was said to be 400: on the English side, two men killed and three or four wounded. The cavalry pursued for a short distance.

On the 25th April, the force broke up from Ghazni, marching by the well-known Shir Daban (Lion Mouth) Pass, northwards towards Kabul. No enemy was subsequently met with.

The later events of the war in Afghanistan, in 1880, it is not proposed to describe in this brief sketch.

The disaster at Maiwand, in August, 1880, was followed by the rapid and successful march of Sir Frederick Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar, and by the defeat of Ayoob Khan, at Kandahar, on the 1st September, 1880. A detailed and interesting description of the march and of the battle of Kandahar was given in a lecture delivered at the United Service Institution, in London, on the 9th March, 1881, by Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, C.B., R.A.

Abdur Rahman, the grandson of Dost Mahomed, was declared by the British Government to be the rightful Amir of Afghanistan, and was received in Durbar at Kabul by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Lepel Griffin, and the officers of the force at Kabul.

Shortly afterwards, the force under Sir Donald Stewart commenced its return march to India, *viâ* Gundamuk, Jalalabad, and the Khyber. The return march was effected with perfect order and regularity, and the troops were unmolested by the hill tribes. Owing to the excellent arrangements made for the march, there was, comparatively speaking, little sickness among the troops, considering the time of the year at which the return march was made.

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